THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES NATIVE EMPLOYMENT POLICY: A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

Background Study prepared for the N.W.T. Legislative Assembly's Special Committee on the Northern Economy

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES' NATIVE EMPLOYMENT POLICY: A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

A Background Study For The Legislative Assembly's
Special Committee On The Northern Economy

by

Mike Bell, Principal
Inukshuk Management Consultants
5404 50A Avenue
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, X1A 1G3
May 1989

90-02636/

This Background Study is one of several prepared for the Special Committee on the Northern Economy. It is being released in the hope that it will be widely circulated and discussed.

The findings of this report are the personal responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Special Commmittee on the Northern Economy.

May, 1989

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY AND INUKTITUT TRANSLATION	i
INTRODUCTION	1.
Reasons For This Study	
Scope and Limitations	
Methodology	
Approach	
CHAPTER ONE: THE POLICY AND THE PROGRAM	6.
Historical Context	
The Native Employment Policy	
The Program	
The Equal Employment Directorate	
CHAPTER TWO: ASSESSMENT	19.
Success or Failure	
Problems With The Policy	
Problems With The Program	
Secondary and Potential Benefits	
The Challenge For The Future	
CHAPTER THREE: THE LEGACY OF PERCEPTIONS	37.
Legacy of a Failed Experiment	
The Accountability Issue	
The Competency Issue	
The Objectivity Issue	
The Reverse-Discrimination Issue	
CHAPTER FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS	50.
The Context For Recommendations	
The Recommendations	
APPENDICES	
A. Native Employment Policy	
B. Statistics	
C. Project Budget	
D. Affirmative Action Policy	

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the GNWT's Native Employment Policy. The policy was introduced in February, 1985 and remained in effect until March, 1989 when it was replaced by the government's new Affirmative Action Policy.

In the Fall of 1988 The Special Committee on the Economy asked Inukshuk Management Consultants to review the policy and come up with some answers to specific questions.

Was the policy effective? What results did it achieve? What was its impact upon the Public Service? Did it teach us some lessons about how to develop a long-term economic development strategy--the mandate of the Special Committee on the Northern Economy?

In terms of effectiveness, this study comes to three basic conclusions.

First, *the policy failed* to achieve its primary goal as a policy--*to significantly increase the number of native employees within the GNWT's Public Service*. Since this study is essentially a policy review, most of the content of the study deals with the reasons for failure.

Second, even though the primary policy objective was not met, there have been *secondary benefits*.

Many native people were hired under the policy, received training and experience, and are presently working for the GNWT. Others have left the GNWT to work with the federal government, native organizations, resource companies, or other parts of the private sector. We have no way of tracing this latter group so the study simply notes their existence.

As for those native employees still working with the GNWT, the report recommends that they be interviewed as part of an overall evaluation of the Native Employment Policy.

Third, there are some *potential benefits*.

Over the past four years government employees have acquired a great deal of experience trying to develop and implement an affirmative action policy. From a few innovative projects, and many failures, there is a much better corporate knowledge of how government should proceed in this area. But this is only a *potential* benefit. The experience will be wasted unless government stops and talks to its employees about their experience. This study addresses potential benefits in its last chapter--Recommendations.

CHAPTER ONE: THE POLICY AND THE PROGRAM

After providing a brief history of the Native Employment Policy, the first chapter describes the policy and the program designed to support it.

The purpose of the policy was to develop *"a Public Service that is competent and representative of the population it serves"*. The policy adopted an affirmative action approach emphasizing results-oriented, measurable targets. It was designed to overcome what government saw as the major reason for lack of native representation--systemic and attitudinal discrimination within the government service.

The directive accompanying the policy stated that the Minister and the Deputy Minister of each department were ultimately responsible for developing and implementing the policy within the department. The Director of the Equal Employment Directorate was responsible for coordination.

The core of the program in each department was an affirmative action plan. This plans spelled out certain numerical and non-numerical objectives and provided a timetable for implementation. It was developed with a five year horizon and revised annually.

Government allocated some training dollars and person years to support the program. The total annual budget for the program over the last four years has ranged between $5 million and $6 million dollars.

The Equal Employment Directorate was the agency responsible for coordinating the policy, promoting it, and providing advise to the Executive Council and senior management.

Its primary function was to assist departments develop their annual affirmative action plans. In addition it monitored progress, developed annual reports, and provided departments with statistical information on the number of native employees.

CHAPTER TWO: ASSESSMENT

In terms of its primary policy objective, the Native Employment Policy was a failure.

Government announced in 1985 that it intended to increase the number of native employees to 52% by 1990. While some departments and regions had more success than others, overall the number of native staff as a percentage of the whole public service increased by only about 2%: from 30% in 1985 to 32% in 1989. (There are some problems with the data base; these are discussed briefly in Appendix B.)

Why did the policy fail?

Because of serious problems with both the policy and the program.

Problems With The Policy

The major problem with the policy was its incorrect assumption about the reason for the lack of native representation. It assumed that the culprit was systemic and attitudinal discrimination within government. But, as it turned out, the real reason for the lack of representation

was, and still is, the lack of native candidates outside government with the necessary qualifications. *Thus the policy was designed to deal with the wrong problem.*

For most government jobs today, Grade 10 is the basic requirement. But in 1986, 63% of native people had less than a Grade 9 education. Though there are undoubtedly some examples of discrimination within government, the evidence indicates that native people who have a Grade 10 education, and want a job with the GNWT, are quite successful in getting one. According to the Equal Employment Directorate, more than one half of native people in the NWT with a Grade 10 education already work for the GNWT.

Additional problems: in introducing the policy government set an impossible target (52%) and timeframe (5 years). Because the target and timeframe were so unrealistic, the whole exercise soon ran into a credibility problem. In addition, government did not provide adequate financial resources to meet the targets and timelines it had set for itself. Finally, the project was not designed properly: the necessary groundwork was not done, and the Equal Employment Directorate did not have an adequate mandate.

The serious problems with the policy can probably be explained by the failure of government to carry out a thorough policy analysis before introducing the policy. This failure also had its impact upon the program.

Problems With The Program

From Day One *the affirmative action plans were inadequate.* When designing these plans with a five year horizon, departments related their targets to the resources they thought they would need. When they received far fewer resources than they requested, the plans should have been revised to bring targets and schedules into line with the new resource realities. Most of them weren't revised. Thus the plans became useless as a viable management tool.

The original intent was to have the affirmative action plans as an integral part of broader and more comprehensive human resource plans. But the *human resource plans were never developed.* Since the departments had little knowledge of their longer term staffing requirements, the hiring of native staff tended to become an end in itself, rather than a means of helping departments provide more relevant services.

To carry our effective affirmative planning, departments require *an adequate information system* which will give them, among other things, some idea of labour supply and demand. Though such a system was contemplated, it *was never developed.*

Managers in departments needed some *technical support* and assistance which, for the most part, *was not available or was too difficult to access.*

Native clients, especially those just entering government, also needed various kinds of support. In many instances, *adequate client support does not seem to have been available.* One result of the lack of support--a chronically high turnover rate. In one year alone, 1986, 431 native people were recruited; but 161 native people quit or were dismissed, a loss of more than one third.

Finally, there was *a lack of evaluation.* Even though it was evident by the end of the first year that government would not be able to meet its corporate target, there was no intervention to see how the project might be improved. Nor did government evaluate the project at the end of four years, prior to introducing its new Affirmative Action Policy. The lack of evaluation was, and still is, a serious problem.

In summary, both the policy and the program were seriously flawed. Serious mistakes were made early in the project, and the project itself never recovered.

Secondary and Potential Benefits

Even though the project failed to achieve its primary objective, there were secondary benefits.

A significant number of native people got jobs, training, and experience under the policy. Many of these people now work as staff for GNWT departments. Their advice on how to improve the affirmative action approach should be sought. Other former staff have moved on to work for other employers. Many of these have benefited from their experience with the GNWT.

There is a also a potential benefit: a wealth of accumulated knowledge about how to implement affirmative action-type programs in the NWT. The project should be evaluated so this knowledge can be utilized.

The Challenge For The Future

Land claim settlements will create an immediate demand for trained native managers, technicians, and office staff. Native organizations will try to recruit many of the GNWT's native staff--thus reducing its native representation further. This study recommends developing cooperative recruiting and training strategies with native organizations.

CHAPTER THREE: THE LEGACY OF PERCEPTIONS

In order to turn things around government will have to deal with some of the "unintended effects" that have resulted from the implementation of the policy. This chapter describes four perceptions which have become issues within the public service and must be resolved.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUE Though the policy itself holds Ministers and Deputy Ministers accountable for the implementation of the policy, in practise there seems to have been little accountability at this level.

Early in the project an accountability vacuum developed. The Department of Personnel stepped into the breach and assumed more and more accountability for the policy. This resulted in serious disputes between the Department of Personnel and other departments.

The study suggests several remedies for the accountability problem. But the main one is to return accountability to the Minister and Deputy Minister where it belongs.

THE COMPETENCY ISSUE. As the Department of Personnel assumed more and more responsibility for making the Native Employment Policy work, some departments began to believe that Personnel was deliberately forcing down standards to promote the hiring of native staff. Some managers became worried about a "competency gap" and fought back.

In some cases they deliberately inflated their requirements when submitting job descriptions for classification. In staffing actions they would tend to favour the strongest candidate rather than the candidate with "the minimum required qualifications".

The study suggests various step that might turn this situation around, including the return of major staffing functions to departments.

THE OBJECTIVITY ISSUE. There is a strong perception among many public servants that Ministers of Personnel exert undue influence over the hiring of staff throughout government. When they intervene it usually seems to be for the benefit of native staff--never for the benefit of non-native staff. This builds resentment and the suspicion that some jobs are being achieved through patronage rather than through merit.

This is a serious problem and has to be dealt with. The study recommends the introduction of a Public Service Commission as the only viable solution.

THE REVERSE-DISCRIMINATION ISSUE. Some non-native employees feel that the policy discriminates against them--particularly in the area of education and training. While the statistics do not point to discrimination as such, they do give a great deal of support to this perception. Since employees often tie education and training to opportunities for promotion and advancement, this perception is creating a sense of alienation among some employees and should be dealt with.

If government is ever to achieve its goal of a truly representative public service, these issues cannot be ignored. They must be dealt with head on...which leads us to our recommendations.

CHAPTER FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS

There are five recommendations. They are broad based and strategic in nature--designed to deal with the various issues described in the study.

1. THAT THE GNWT SET UP A SPECIAL COMMISSION TO CONDUCT A COMPLETE REVIEW OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

2. THAT THE GNWT CREATE A PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IN THE NWT AND REORGANIZE THE PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS.

3. THAT THE GNWT CONDUCT AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIVE EMPLOYMENT POLICY

4. THAT THE GNWT DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A HUMAN RESOURCE INFORMATION AND PLANNING SYSTEM

5. THAT THE GNWT ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MAJOR NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS TO DEVELOP COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES FOR RECRUITING AND DEVELOPING NATIVE STAFF.

ᓇᐃᓐᓕᕆᔨᒪᔪᖅ

ᐱᒋᐊᕐᓂᖅ

ᒎᓪᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᓕᐅᔭᖅ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᓚᒪᓐᓇᐅᑉᑕ ᖃᓪᓗᐊᑦᑐᑦᑕᓂᓕ ᓴᓇᓕᐅᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᓯᒪᑦ. ᐊᑐᐊᖅ ᓴᖅᑭᑎᑕᐅᓕᐅᔭᕐᓗᖅ ᐃᔭᐊᓕ 1985-ᒥ, ᐊᑐᑕᐅᔨᓐᓇᓕᐅᑦᓄᓕᓐ ᒪᓕᕐ, 1989-ᒧᑦ ᑎᑭᓪᓚᕐᔪᒍ ᐃᓇᔨᑕᐅᑦᓄᓕᓐ ᓚᒪᓐᓇᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᓱᓕᕐᑕᓐᓂᖅᑐᑦ ᓄᒋᒧᑦ ᐃᓕᐃᓐᓇᑕᐅᓕᓂᒧᑦ ᐱᓕᓱᐊᖅᓂᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᓯᒪᑦ.

ᐅᑭᐊᖅᓴᖅᓂᓕ 1988 ᑲᑎᒪᔨᕆᓪᓚᕆᐊᓇᓐᓂᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᑦᑕᑦᑐᒥ ᒪᑭᒪᓵᔨᑎᖅᓴᑦ ᐱᓵᔨᑎᓕᓵᑦ ᐊᐱᓱᓕ-ᐅᑦᑐᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᓱᐊᑦ ᐊᐅᓕᕐᑎᑦᑕᓐᓂᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᔨᔪᐃᔨᓂᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐃᓐᓇᑦᑐᖅ ᐊᐱᖅᓯᐅᑉᖃᖅᑐᑦ-ᑕᑦᑐᓪᓗ ᑭᐅᐅᔨᓴᓕᐅᑦᑐᓪᓗ ᐃᓄᐃᓱᐊᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᓯᒪᑦ.

ᐊᑐᐊᖅ ᐃᑲᔨᑎᖃᖅᑎᐊᓕᐅᑦᑐᕐᒃ? ᖃᓄᖅ ᑭᐅᔨᔪᑎᖃᖅᑎᑎᓕᐅᑦᑐᕐᒃ? ᖃᓄᖅ ᐃᓕᐱᓐᓇᓴᖃᖅᑎᑎᓕ-ᐅᑦᑐᕐᒃ ᓚᒪᓐᓇᑦ ᐃᖃᓄᐃᓕᑦᑎᑦᑕᓄᑦ? ᐃᓕᓴᐅᑎᔨᔪᑎᖃᖅᑎᑦᑕᓂᖅ ᓴᖅᑭᑎᑕᐅᓕᐅᑦᑐᕐᒃ ᖃᓄᖅ ᕿᑎᐃᓕ-ᑎᑎᓇᓵᖅᑕᑦᑎᓄᑦ-ᐊᑯᓂᐅᔨᔪᖅ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᓕᓴᓪᓚᑦ ᐱᓕᕐᑕᓐᓂᑦ ᐃᓕᓴᐅᑎᖃᖅᑎᑦᑕᓂᓕᐅᑎᒍᑎ-- ᐱᓕ-ᓴᐊᓚᖅᑐᓄᑦᓗ ᐅᑭᐅᑦᑕᑦᑐᒥ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᕆᓪᓚᕆᐊᓇᓐᓂᑦ ᓚᒪᓐᓇᑦ ᐱᓵᔨᑎᓕᓵᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᑦᑎ-ᑎᑎᖅᑕᐅᓕᐅᑦᑐᕐᒃ?

ᐃᑲᔨᑎᖃᓂᖅ ᐃᓗᒪᓕᓚᒍ, ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᔪᐃᓂᐅᔨᔪᖅ ᐱᖓᓱᓕᖓᔪᓚᓂᓗ ᓄᖓᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᓗᐊᓂ.

ᓱᕐᓚᓕᑦ. ᐊᑐᐊᖅ ᑐᑦᓯᐊᓕᓴᒪᓕᐅᑦᑕᖓᓂᖅ ᑐᑦᓯᐊᖃᓕᐅᑦᑐᒃᓯᒪᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᓕᐅᑦ ᐱᔨᑦᑕᐅᔪᖅᓯᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᒡᓕᑦᑕᓕᕆᔨᑦᑕᐅᔪᓕᓴᒪᓕᐅᖅᓯᒪᑦ -- ᖃᓪᓗᐊᑦᑐᑦᑕᓂᓕ ᓴᓇᓕᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᓚᒪᓐᓇᑦᑐᓂ ᐱᓕᕐᑕᓐ-ᓂᓐᓂ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᔪᑦᑕᐅᔪᖅ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᓯᒪᓕᐅᑦᑐᒃᓯᒪᑦ, ᑕᒪᐃᓐᓇᖅᖃᖅᑐᖅ ᐅᖃᐅᔨᔪᐃᓂᐅᔨᔪᖅ ᑐᑦᓯᐊᓂᐅᔨᔪᖅ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᓯᒪᓕᐅᑦᑐᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᓱᐊᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᔨᔪᐃᓂᐅᔨᔪᖅ ᐅᑭᐅᑦᑕᑦᑐᒥ ᐅᖃᐅᔨᔪᐃᓂᐅᔨᔪᖅ.

ᑐᑭᓯᓚᐅᔪᖅ ᖃᓪᓗᐊᑦᑐᑦᑕᓂᓕ ᓴᓇᓕᐅᑦ ᐊᓂᒍᕐᓚᓕᐅᑦᑐᕐᒃ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᓴᒥᒃ, ᐃᓕᓴᐅᑎᓴᒪᓕᐅᑦᑐᕐᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᖃᖅᑐᑦ-ᖃᓄᐃᓱᐊᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᖃᖅᑎᑦᑕᓂᓕ, ᐊᒻᒪ ᒪᓐᓇᐅᔪᖅ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᓚᒪᓐᓇᑦᑐᑦᑕᓂᓕ ᐃᓕᓴᐅᑎᖃᖅᑎᑦᑕᓂᓕ. ᐃᓕᓴᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᓚᒪᓐᓇᑦᑐᑦᑕᓂᓕ ᓴᓇᓕᐅᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᑦ ᓚᒪᓐᓇᑦᑐᑦᑕᓂᓕ, ᖃᓪᓗᐊᑦᑐᑦᑕᓂᓕ ᓴᓇᓕᐅᑦᑐᑦᑕᓂᓕ ᐃᓄᐃᓱᐊᑦ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᕆᓪᓚᕆᐊᓇᓐᓂᑦ, ᐱᓕᕐᑕᓐᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᓯᒪᓕᐅᑦᑐᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᓱᐊ

ᖃᓪᓗᐊᑦᑐᖅᑐᑦ ᓄᓕ ᐃᖅᑲᓇᐃᔨᖅᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᑦᐊᑦ ᓴᓇᒪᓂᐊᓂᓐᓂᒃ, ᐅᓂᖃᖅᑎᑕᐅᔪᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᓕᖏᑦᑐᐊᕐᓂᖅᓯᐅᑉᐳᓪᓚᕆᓂᖅ ᐊᑐᐊᒃᓴᖅᑎᑕᐅᔪᓂᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅᑐᑦ ᖃᖅᑎᑕᐅᔪᓂᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᑦᓂᓐᓄᑦ ᖃᖅᑎᑕᐅᔪᓂᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᑦᓂᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒃᓴ

ᑲᓇᒪᓂᒃ ᑐᓂᐅᖃᐃᓇᒪᐅᑦᑐᑦ ᐃᓕᓴᐅᔪᑎᑦᓯᓚᑦᑎᓂᓕᒫᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᐅᔨᒃ ᐃᖅᑲᐃᔨᑦᑎᓂᓕᒫᓂᓗ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᓂᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᑐᐊᒪᓂᖅ. ᐱᓇᐅᔨᑦ ᐅᓄᖅᓂᑦ ᐊᖏᔪᒥ ᑕᒪᐃᓐᓂᒃ ᐅᑭᐅᔭᓕᐅᑦᑐᓂ ᓯᑕᐅᒪᔨᓂᖅ $5-ᒥᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪ $6-ᒥᓂᒃ.

ᐊᑦᔨᑎᑦᑎᓇᓯᐊᑦᑎᒃᓯᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᖏᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᔨᐅᓕᐅᑦᑐᑦ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᖅᑎᑦᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᐊᒪᖏᑦ, ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓴᕐᓂᐊᓂᓇᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ, ᐃᒪᓐᓇᐃᓐᓇᓂᓗ ᐊᑐᐊᒪᖏᑦᑐᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᖅᑎᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᖅᑎᑦᑕᐅᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᐊᒪᖏᑦᑐᓂ ᐊᑐᐊᒪᖏᑦᑐᓂ ᐊᑐᐊᒪᖏᑦᑐᓂ

ᓄᕐᓄᑦᖢᓪᓕᓄ ᑕᒪᓐᓇᐅᑦᑐᓐᓇᖅᑐᖅ, ᖃᓪᓗᓈᑦᑐᖅᑐᑦ ᓴᓇᓇᔨᖅᑐᑦ ᓚᒋᓚᐅᑦ ᒧᓐᓄᓕᒫᖅ ᖃᓄᖅᑲᓚᐅᖅᑐᓐᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᓕᓚᐅᖃᖅᓯᓐᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᓕᕆᓂᖅ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᓕᕆᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᖏᖅᑎᑦᑎᓂᖅ ᑭᒃᑯᓕᕆᔨᓂᖅ ᑕᑯᓚᒋᔭᖅᑎᑦᑎᓂᖅ.

ᑕᒪᐃᓐᓄᖅᑲᖅ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓂ ᐱᓕᕆᓐᖓᖅᓄᓐᓂ, ᐅᓪᓗᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᐃᓕᓐᓄᐊᖅᓄᖅᑲᓚᐅᖅᑐᑦ ᔪᓚᑦ 10-ᒥᑦ. ᑭᓯᐊᓂ 1986-ᒥ, 63% ᖃᓪᓗᓈᑦᑐᖅᑐᑦ ᐃᓕᓐᓄᐊᖅᓄᖅᑲᓚᐅᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᑎᑭᓯᒪᔪᐃᓐᓇᓐᓂᖅᑐᑦ ᔪᓚᑦ 9-ᒧᑦ. ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ ᐅᖃᑎᖅᓴᐃᑦ ᑕᐃᒪᐅᓚᐊᖅᑎᓪᓗᒥᑦ ᐃᓕᐃᓐᓇᕐᓂᒥᑦ ᑐᑭᖓᓚᑦ, ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔨᖅᑐᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᔨᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᑕᒪᓚᐊᖅ ᖃᓪᓗᓈᑦᑐᖅᑐᑦ ᔪᓚᑦ 10-ᒥᑦ ᐃᓕᓐᓄᐊᖅᓄᖅᑲᓚᐅᖅᑐᓂᖅᑐᑦ, ᓴᓇᔨᒪᔨᓐᓇ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᑦ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ, ᓴᓇᖃᖅᑕᓕᐊᓂᓐᓂᖅᓄᓐᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔨᖅᑐᖅᓯᒪᒃᑕᖅᑕᓂᖅᑐᓂᖅ ᓴᓇᔨᓂᖅᑎᑦᑎᓂᖅᓯᒪᓕᖅᑕᖅ. ᐊᐃᔨᓂᖅᑎᓂᖅᓄᓇᓕᐊᑦᑐᖅ ᐃᓅᖃᓇᐃᔨᓂᓪᓗ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᐅᖃᖅᑐᖅᑕᖅ, ᓇᐸᓪᓗᒍ ᐅᓕᓐᓄᐊᖅᓄᖅᑲᓚᐅᖅᑐᑦ ᐃᓅᖃᓇᐃᔨᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᓴᖅᓴᓂᖅᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ.

ᓇᓱᒪᓂᑐᓄᑦ: ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᑕᒪᑦᑕᓪᓕᖅᑐᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓂ ᑕᒪᓐᓇᐅᑦᑐᓐᓇᖅᑐᖅ ᑎᑭᓯᒪᔪᐃᓐᓇᓐᓂᖅᑐᑦ (52%-ᒥᑦ) ᐊᓱᒪ ᐅᑭᐅᓂᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᓐᓄᐊᖅᓄᖅᑲᓚᐅᖅᑐᓂᖅᑐᑦ (5-ᓂᑦ). ᑐᓴᖏᐅᔪᓐᓇᖅ ᐱᓕᕆᔨᓴᓕᐅᑎᓪᓗᒥᓂᖅᓄᓐᓂ ᑕᐃᒪᓐᓇᐃᓐᓂᐅᕐᓂᖅᓄᓐᓂᓕᒫᓂᑦ, ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᓕᕆᓂᖅᑕᖅ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᒋᓐ ᓴᓇᓕᖅᑐᓂᖅᓄᓐᓂ ᑐᑭᖓᓚᑦ ᐃᓅᖃᓇᐃᔨᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᓴᖅᓴᓂᖅᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ. ᐊᓱᒪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓂ ᐱᓇᐅᑦᑐᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᓂᓪᓗᐊᓕᐅᑎᓪᓗᒥᓂᖅᓄᓐᓂ ᑐᑭᖓᓚᑦᓂ ᐃᓅᖃᓇᐃᔨᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᐊᑐᖅᑕᐅᓇᖅᑐᓂᖅᓄᓐᓂ ᐊᓕᓚᐅᖃᖅᓯᓐᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᓂᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᓂᓪᓗᐊᓕᐅᑎᓪᓗᒥᓂᖅᓄᓐᓂ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᓴᖅᓴᓂᖅᑐᑦ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ. ᐱᓇᓱᐊᓂᖅᑐᑦ ᐃᓅᖃᓇᐃᔨᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ.

ᐃᓕᓐᓄᐊᖅᓄᖅᑲᓚᐅᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ.

ᐃᓕᓐᓄᐊᖅᓄᖅᑲᓚᐅᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑕᖅ ᐊᑐᐃᓐᓇᐅᓂᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᓪᓗ ᓚᒋᓚᑦᓄᓐ.

ᐃᓕᐃᓐᓇᑦᑕᐃᓕᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᖑᓂᐊᑎᓄᑦ ᑭᓇᐃᒍᑎᓂᑦ ᐃᓕᓴᐅᑎᐅᔪᓕᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦ ᑭᑐᑐᐃᓐ-ᓇᐃᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᒧᑦ ᑭᓇᐃᒍᑎᑦᓯᒪᓂᓐᓄᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᓴᓂᐊᓂᒧᑦ. ᑭᒧᐊᓂ ᑭᑐᑐᐃᓐᓇᐃᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᒧᑦ ᑭᓇᐃᒍᑎᓂᑦ ᓴᖅᑭᑎᓕᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᑐᖅᓯᒪᓕᒡᒥ. ᐃᓗᖓᓇᐃᔪᖅᑎᐅᑉᐳᓂᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓗᒃᑐᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᓂᕆᐅᒋ-ᔪᖅᓇᐊᖅᓄᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓂᐅᓂᖅᓄᖅ ᐃᓗᖓᓇᐃᔪᖅᑎᐅᑉᐳᓂᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᓴᓂᒧᑦ, ᓴᓇᔨᒡᓕᑦᓂᓕᕆᓂᖅᓄᖅ ᐃᓗᖓᓇᐃᔪᖅᑎᐅᑉᐳᓂᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᓴᓇᓂᒧᑦᓯᒪᓂᓐᓄᑦ ᐅᓪᓗᑎᒃᑲᓇᑕᒥ, ᐱᓕᕆᐊᓴᓂᐊᓂᒧᑦ ᐃᓗᖓᓇᐃᔪᖅᑎᐅᑉᐳᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᓂᖅᓄᖅ

ᐊᒥᓱᓕᓚᐅᕐᔪᑦ ᖃᓪᓗᒍᑦᑐᖅᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᔨᖏᓪᓕᐅᕐᓂᖅ, ᐃᓕᓴᓂᐊᖅᑎᑕᐅᓕᕐᓂᑐᒃᓴ, ᐊᓪᓚ ᐊᑐᐊᖅᓴᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓕᓴᑎᑎᑕᐅᓚᓱᑐᑦ ᐊᒥᓱᓕᐅᕐᓂᖅ. ᐊᒥᓱᓕᓚᐅᕐᓂᑐᒃ ᑕᓴᓐᖏᑦ ᐃᖏᓪᓗᓂᑦ ᓄᓇᑎᐊᕐᓂᖅ ᓴᓇᔨᓄᑦᑐᑦ ᐃᖏᓪᓗᓂᑦ. ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᖏᖅᑭᑦᓴᕐᑕᐅᔪᓐᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᐱᓕᕐᓂᑐᖅᑐᑦ ᐃᓕᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᐃᓕᓴᕐᓂᖅᑐᑦ ᐃᖏᓪᓗᓂᑦ ᐃᖏᓪᓗᓂᑦ ᐃᖏᓪᓗᓂᑦ ᐃᓕᓴᕐᓂᖅᑐᑦ ᐃᓕᓴᕐᓂᖅᑐ

ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐃᓚᓱᒪᓕᕆᓂᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᑎᓴᓴᐅᓇᓱᑦᑐᓄᑦ ᐃᓕᒪᑕᓴᐅᔪᓂᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᓕᖃᖅᑐᑦ> ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑭᓇᒧᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᔨᐅᒪᖃᖅᑎᓂᖅ ᐱᔪᓐᓂᒪᔪᒍ ᑭᓇ ᓴᑕᐅᒪᖃᖅᑐᓴᑦᑐᓂᖅ ᐱᔪᓐᓂᒪᔪᒍ. ᑭᓕᐊᓂᑦᑕᐅᖅ ᐅᑎᑦ-ᑎᑦᑎᒪᖃᖅᑐᑦᒍᑦ ᓴᑕᐅᔪᓐᓇᖅᓄᑦ ᒥᓂᑕᒧᑦ ᑐᓴᕐᓂᓐᓄ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᑲᒪᒋᔨᖅᓴᓇᓕᕆᓂᖅᓄᑦ.

ᐃᓕᒪᑕᓴᐅᔪᖅᑐᖅ ᐊᔪᔨᑕᖃᖅᓴᓇᖅᑐᒥᑦ ᑲᒪᒋᔨᖃᖅᑕᑦᑎᓂᒥᑦ ᑲᒪᒋᔨᖃᖅᑎᑦᑕᓂᖅᓴᖃᖅᑐᓂᒃᑯᑦᑐᓂᒃᑯᑦ, ᐃᓕᓴᑦ ᐃᓅᓚᐅᔾᔨᖅᑕᖅ ᐃᓕᓴᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖅᓄᑦ ᐃᓅᓚᐅᔾᔨᖅᑕᖅ ᐃᓕᓴᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᖅᓄᑦ

ᓴᓇᒪᓂᖅ ᑐᑦᓯᐊᓕᓚᖅᑕᖅᓂᖅ ᑎᑭᓇᓐᓂᕐᒥᑦ ᓴᓇᒪᓂᖅᓂᒃ ᑭᖑᑦᑐᐃᓕᑎᐊᖅᓂᕐᒪᑦ ᑐᑦᓯᐊᖃᖅᓯᒪᑎᓐᓄᑦ, ᑕᒪᓐᓇᐋ ᐃᓕᓴᕐᑎᑎᓕᕆᔨᑦ >ᐃᔪᑦᑕᐅᓕᒪᓕᐊᖃᖅᑐᓕᓪ. ᑭᐅᓵᐅᓕᓕᒫᓚᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᒃᑐᓕᕆᐊᖃᖅ-ᐊᖃᖅᓴᓪ...ᐊᑐᐊᖅᑐᑎᓐᓂᖅ ᑎᑭᓴᕐᑕᐅᔪᖅᖢᓪ.

ᓴᓪᒪᓕᖅ 4: ᐊᑐᓕᖅᑕᐅᓪᓚᑦ

ᑕᓐᓕᒪᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᑐᓕᖅᑕᐅᓪᓚᑦ. ᐊᑕᐅᓴᐅᑎᕐᑐᒍᑦ ᑐᑦᓯᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐃᓕᓐᓂᓴᓴᐅᖅᑕᐅᓪᓚᑦᓴᓐᓂᓗ ᑐᑦᓯᖏᓐᓄᑦ--ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᓴᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᓴᐅᓕᐅᑐᒍᓂᖅ ᑭᐅᓴᕐᑕᐅᓐᓴᓂᖅᖢᓪ.

1. ᓄᓇᕐᑎᐊᑦ ᓴᓇᒪᓂᖏᓪᓕ ᓴᓐᑭᑦᑎᓗᓂᒃ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᓴᓂᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᐃᐃᓐᓇᓂᒃ ᓴᓇᒪᓂᖏᓪᓕ ᐱᓕᕆᖏᓐᓂᒃ.

2. ᓄᓇᕐᑎᐊᑦ ᓴᓇᒪᓂᖏᓪᓕ ᐊᖏᖅᓱᓗᓂᒃ ᓴᓇᒪᓂᖏᓪᓕ ᐱᓕᕆᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑎᓂᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕐᑎᐊᖏᑦ ᐊᑦᓚ ᐊᖏᖅᑭᐊᓱᓗᓂᒃ ᐃᓅᓂᐃᑲᓴᕐᑎᓂᒃᓄᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᓕᓵᕐᑕᐅᓂᒃ.

3. ᓄᓇᕐᑎᐊᑦ ᓴᓇᒪᓂᖏᓪᓕ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐃᓚᓗᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᖅᑭᑦᑐᓂᕐᒥᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᓕᕆᓂᒃ.

4. ᓄᓇᕐᑎᐊᑦ ᓴᓇᒪᓂᖏᓪᓕ ᐱᔪᓐᓇᕐᓂᓚᓗᓂᒃ ᐊᑐᓕᕆᓂᕐᓂᓚᓗᓂᒃ ᑭᑐᑐᐃᓐᓇᐃᑦ ᓴᓇᓂᒧᑦ ᑐᓴᕆᓴᕆᓂᕐᒥᓂᒃ ᕿᓐᓄᓕᒫᓴᕆᓂᕐᒥᓪᓗ.

5. ᓄᓇᕐᑎᐊᑦ ᓴᓇᒪᓂᖏᓪᓕ ᐊᖏᖅᖃᓄᐃᓕᓴᖅᖃᓂᒃ ᐊᖏᕐᓂᒃ ᖃᓄᖅᑭᑦᑐᓂᕐᒥᑦ ᑲᑐᔪᖃᓄᐃᑎᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᖑᓪᓕᐊᓇᖅᑐᓂᖅ ᐃᓅᓂᐃᑲᓴᕐᑎᓂᒃ ᐱᔪᓐᓇᕐᓂᒥᑦ ᐱᔪᕿᓐᓄᓕᒫᓂᕐᒪᓂᓴᓐᓂᓪᓗ ᖃᓄᖅᑭᑦᑐᓂᕐᒪᑦ ᐃᓅᓂᐃᑲᓴᕐᑎᒍᑦ.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1988 the Legislative Assembly's Special Committee on the Northern Economy asked **Inukshuk Management Consultants** to review the Government of the Northwest Territories' Native Employment Policy. The Special Committee wanted answers to some very specific questions.

Has the policy succeeded? Has it significantly increased the number of native employees within the Government of the Northwest Territories?

If it has been successful, what accounts for the success?

If it has failed, what are the reasons for failure, and how can these be overcome?

And what does this whole experience teach us about the development of a long-term economic development strategy?

This report, "The Government Of The Northwest Territories' Native Employment Policy: A Review and Assessment", presents the results of our findings.

In the rest of this introductory chapter we will outline the reasons for the study, its scope and limitations, our methodology, and our approach.

The Reasons For This Study

While scanning the NWT economy to determine which elements should receive special attention, The Special Committee locked in on the GNWT's Native Employment Policy. This was not surprising.

NATIVE EMPLOYMENT POLICY

It has long been obvious, to even the casual observer, that native people receive very few benefits from the economy as a whole. Though they make up the majority of the population, they are under represented in all sectors of the economy.

The problem is most apparent in the area of employment. Over the years native people have had great difficulty securing and holding jobs, even in communities where they were by far the largest population group.

The GNWT knew that it had to deal with this problem. It also knew that to provide the necessary leadership it had to first get its own house in order. So, in 1985 it brought in its Native Employment Policy.

The stated objective of the policy was: to develop a public service "that is competent and representative of the population it serves." The Government gave itself five years to get the job done. During that time period it intended to increase the number of native people employed by the GNWT from just under 30% to 52%, the approximate size of the native population in the N.W.T. as a whole.

Government committed significant resources and energies to the task. It set up a 12 person operation--The Equal Employment Directorate--to coordinate the implementation of the policy.

A budget was created for training and upgrading. Government gave its departments very clear instructions that they were to recruit native people on the basis of carefully constructed affirmative action plans. The thrust of the policy was to break down any systemic and attitudinal barriers that kept native people from securing employment.

Outside government the GNWT made sure residents knew about the policy. From Day One it was high profile and often controversial. Though government policies often fade from public consciousness shortly after they are introduced, we doubt that there is a single adult resident in the Northwest Territories today that does not know about the GNWT's Native Employment Policy --and does not have strong feelings about it one way or another.

Has the policy worked? Has the percentage of native people increased significantly within the GNWT public service?

In terms of the numbers, the answer is no. Though there are some difficulties determining the actual number of native employees within government (see Appendix B), the policy has succeeded in raising the percentage of native people by only about 2%--from 30% in 1985 to 32% in 1989.

But there have been some secondary benefits. As we shall see in the following pages, under the policy a significant number of native people got jobs, along with training and work experience.

There are also some potential benefits. Over the past four years GNWT employees have learned a great deal about how to design and implement an affirmative action program--and how not to do it.

Scope and Limitations

This study is not a formal evaluation of the Native Employment Policy and the program that has emerged from it. It is, rather, ***a policy review***.

Our intent is to examine the policy and look into how government has tried to implement it. Hopefully this modest probing will teach us some lessons that will prove useful in developing a long-term economic development strategy for the Northwest Territories.

The Terms of reference for the study provided by the Special Committee reflect this modest scope:

1. To describe the Native Employment Policy and how it works in practise;

2. To describe the impact of the policy on the public service;

3. To document the success rate (in terms of percentage increases) since policy was introduced;

4. To describe the work of the Equal Employment Directorate, its role vis a vis government departments, and the manner in which it administers the policy.

5. To identify issues related to the implementation of the policy and, when appropriate, recommend solutions.

Methodology

In conducting this study we followed the traditional approach.

We reviewed the written literature, especially the annual reports developed by the Equal Employment Directorate. We found these to be an excellent source of information, not only about the policy and its implementation, but about the significant obstacles that, over time, forced a re-examination of the policy.

We interviewed Senior Managers within the Equal Employment Directorate and within a number of other departments. Though we encountered a great deal of frustration with the policy we also discovered a consensus emerging about how it might be improved.

Finally, we reviewed the statistics to determine the extent to which the policy has, or has not succeeded, in meeting its objectives.

Approach

The approach we have adopted for presenting our findings is straightforward. There are four chapters, followed by appendices.

Chapter One, **THE POLICY AND THE PROGRAM**, describes the policy and the manner in which it has been implemented. It covers

the historical background, the role of the Equal Employment Directorate, and the various program elements designed to carry out the program.

Chapter Two, **ASSESSMENT**, contains our critique of the policy and of the program designed to carry it out. It also describes secondary benefits and takes a look at prospects for the future.

Chapter Three, **LEGACY OF PERCEPTIONS**, describes four major issues that have developed over the past four years. Government must address these issues if it is to significantly increase the number of native people in the public service.

Chapter Four, **RECOMMENDATIONS**, contains our suggestions for improving the policy and its implementation.

There are five appendices. They provide some backup material.

CHAPTER ONE

THE POLICY AND THE PROGRAM

In this Chapter we will examine the Native Employment Policy and the way the Government of the Northwest Territories has carried it out.

We will begin with the historical context, examine the policy itself, and look at the program designed to support it. We will conclude the Chapter with a brief look at the role of the Equal Opportunity Directorate.

1. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Native Employment Policy has its roots in the work of the Task Force on Personnel Policy.

In 1973, five years after the transfer of Government from Ottawa to Yellowknife, the Commissioner, Stuart Hodgson, decided to review all aspects of GNWT Personnel and management policy. He set up the Task Force on Personnel Policy under the chairmanship of Mr. Ewan Cotterill, and gave it the mandate to examine all aspects of GNWT personnel and management policy.

In 1976 the task force published its Final Report To The Commissioner Of The Northwest Territories On Personnel Policy and Management. Contained within the report were several specific recommendations which laid the foundation for the present Native Employment Policy.

Recommendation Number Seventeen stated:

> The Task Force recommends the adoption as a major objective of the Territorial Public Service, that the Public Service should reflect at all levels the ratio of native northerners to the population of the Northwest Territories. For the purpose of this objective, native northerners would be defined as Indian, Inuit, and Metis.

Recommendation Number Eighteen stated:

> The Task Force Recommends that in order to meet the objective in Recommendation Seventeen, training positions be created, available to northerners, up to ten percent of the total establishment of the Public Service.

The task force left no doubt that it was serious about helping develop a truly representative Public Service. In Appendix D entitled "Goals of the Government of the Northwest Territories", the Final Report noted:

> Emphasis at this time will be given to policy guidelines which give priority to:...(5)the increase in participation and responsibility of native people within the institutions of the Government of the Northwest Territories.

In 1976 the Commissioner, on the recommendation of the Executive Committee, created the Office of Native Employment. It was set up within the Department of Personnel to help determine the employment needs of native northerners, provide counselling and special training, and maintain accurate statistics on native employment.

Unfortunately, the work of the Office Of Native Employment did not meet expectations. One of its major handicaps was the lack of a specific native employment policy.

In 1985 this situation was corrected.

By now The Executive Council had taken over many of the responsibilities of the Commissioner. There was strong support within the Council, and within the Legislative Assembly, to increase the representation of native people within the public service.

The Executive Council instructed the Department of Personnel to review the work of the Office of Native Employment. Out

of this review came a new Native Employment Policy and the recommendation to set up a stronger coordinating agency--the Equal Employment Directorate.

In March, 1989, as this study neared completion, The Government of the Northwest Territories tabled a new Affirmative Action Policy in the Legislative Assembly. This policy replaced the Native Employment Policy. It extends affirmative action provisions to women, handicapped persons, and indigenous non-aboriginal persons.

2. THE NATIVE EMPLOYMENT POLICY

The Native Employment Policy is much like every other policy of the Government of the N.W.T. There is a policy statement followed by a set of principles. Attached to the policy is a Directive--an administrative document which explains and interprets the policy.

Policy Statement.

The statement describes the ultimate goal of the policy by describing its two basic elements: "a Public Service that is competent and representative of population it serves". Presumably these two elements are compatible and are not to be achieved at the expense of one or the other.

In the second sentence of the policy statement the government indicates how it will achieve this ultimate goal. It will support and foster "*equity in employment* and *career development* of aboriginal peoples indigenous to the Northwest Territories." (Italics ours).

Principles

There are seven principles. Five of these, when taken together, present a sort of contractual arrangement between the government and the aboriginal person seeking employment, training, and/or promotional opportunities.

The government will take the initiative in recruiting, hiring, training and ensuring aboriginal peoples have opportunities for promotion (#3). It will ensure that they have equal access to employment, training, and promotional opportunities. (#2) It will take a leadership role in developing affirmative action programs (#5 and #6).

The aboriginal person, for his or her part, is responsible for his or her own career development (with the assistance of the government). The individual must "plan and initiate actions to take advantage of employment, training, and promotional opportunities in the Territorial Public Service." (#4)

The first principle (#1) is very interesting and very confusing. It notes that "the objective" of the government is "to establish a Public Service able to communicate in the recognized aboriginal languages of the Northwest Territories and reflecting the cultural composition of the population it serves." Since the objective of the policy was already included in the policy statement--"a public services that is competent and representative of the population it serves"--this new objective simply creates confusion.

What is the real objective of the policy? Is it public servants who can speak native languages and reflect the cultural composition of the population? Or is it a public service which is competent and representative of the Northwest Territories--as the policy statement indicates?

It is a public service which is competent and representative of the Northwest Territories. There is no reference in the directive which follows to "aboriginal languages" nor to "cultural composition". To the extent that we can tell,

there has been no serious attempt on the part of the government to make language capabilities an essential part of the recruiting process. The term "cultural composition" is much more specific than the broader term "representative"; and tying it too closely to the concept of service presents a number of pitfalls. (For example, it would seem to militate against hiring Dene or Metis people, under the policy, to serve in Inuit Communities, and vice-versa.)

Given the confusion about objectives, we will assume in our study that the objective of the policy is "...a Public Service that is competent and representative of the population it serves."

The last principle (#7) states that affirmative action will be an essential part of the human resource planning process throughout the Public Service. Though this point is significant, (as we shall see later on in our analysis of the policy) it is much more a statement of desirable administrative practice than a principle designed to guide policy.

Finally, both the policy statement and the principles are interesting for what they do not say ...but what they imply.

Though the principles do not state there is racial discrimination within the public service, the emphasis on equity in employment and career development imply that there is a lack of equity and opportunity for advancement.

Put more simply, native people are not getting government jobs because they are being kept out of government--by systemic and/or attitudinal barriers which are discriminatory. Once they do get jobs, government does not do enough to help them advance their careers. Presumably, correcting these two problems will create the desired balance in terms of representation.

As we shall see later on, targeting discrimination as the major reasons for under representation, and designing the policy to overcome it, was a fundamental design mistake.

The Directive

The directive accompanying the policy is typical of most GNWT policy directives. It defines the scope, provides definitions, and lists provisions--statements of accountability.

Two items are of particular interest: the question of who is to be held accountable and the creation of the position of Director, Equal Employment Directorate.

ACCOUNTABILITY Though the policy describes the accountabilities of various individuals and bodies, it is the Ministers (c.1) the Deputy Ministers or equivalent (e.1,e.111) and the Regional Directors (f.1,f.111) who are accountable for 1) developing affirmative action plans and, 2) implementing the plans.

Unfortunately, the directive introduces definite confusion in terms of accountability. There are two sets of affirmative action plans: those developed by the Minister and Deputy Ministers, and those developed by the Regional Directors. Though each group is required to consult the other, dividing responsibility for the same tasks between two groups creates confusion.

(This confusion was cleared up in 1986. The authority of Regional Directors was downgraded and Deputy Ministers became responsible for developing the plans. As we shall see later on--excluding Regional Directors from a significant role in the process was undoubtedly a mistake.)

Worthy of note: the directive does not assign any specific role to the Department of Personnel, even though the Minister responsible for the Equal Employment is also the Minister responsible for the Department of Personnel.

THE DIRECTOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT DIRECTORATE The policy establishes this position and gives the incumbent significant responsibilities.

The Director reports to the Minister and recommends overall affirmative action strategies. He or she also chairs an affirmative action advisory committee, coordinates service-

wide affirmative action planning, provides planning advice to deputy ministers(who must submit progress reports to the Directorate), evaluates progress and provides progress reports to the Minister.

The Director is also accountable for "establishing a data-base on under represented groups (plural) in the Government of the Northwest Territories Public Service." Presumably, the plural refers to other under represented groups as well as aboriginal peoples,--but the reference is ambivalent. The director must also make available "information required by departments for affirmative action planning."(d.vi)

This later requirement is somewhat confusing. Are we to assume that "information required by departments for affirmative action planning" is limited to the information that comes from the Director's information base on under-represented groups? Or should we take the statement more literally: that the director should " make available (the kinds of) information required by department's for affirmative action planning.

Unfortunately, the former, more limited interpretation was adopted. As we shall see, departments have received information on under-represented groups in their establishments; but this has not provided them with the information they need to carry out effective affirmative action planning.

To summarize, the GNWT's Native Employment Policy is straightforward enough--though it does contain certain inconsistencies. A more serious problem, as we shall see in the next chapter, is the assumption it makes about why native peoples are not adequately represented in the public service.

3. THE PROGRAM

To implement the policy, government--through the Equal Employment Directorate,--developed a comprehensive program. Described in some detail in the annual reports, the program is divided into two basic elements--departmental action plans, and special measures and supporting activities.

Departmental Affirmative Action Plans

Each year since the inception of the policy, departments have been required to develop annual affirmative action plans and submit them to the Directorate. These plans have been looked upon as the heart and soul of the implementation process. According to the First Annual Report published in 1986, the action plans contained 5 essential elements.

There was a *Situation Analysis* describing the current level of representation of native people within job groups. Attitudinal and Systemic barriers were also indicated.

Each plan contained *Numerical Objectives and Timetables* for increasing the representation of native people within the department.

There was a listing of *Non-numerical Objectives and Activities.* These included specific activities aimed at neutralizing barriers to employment in six areas: awareness, recruitment, screening and selection, job accommodation, career counselling and development, and promotion.

Each plan contained a section, *Delegation of Responsibilities*, indicating who was responsible for the developing the plans and the financial resources that were required to implement the plans.

Finally, there was a listing of *Monitoring Mechanisms* indicating how the plans would be implemented.

Special Measures and Supporting Activities.

To assist the departments meet their targets, a number of special measures were called for: specific strategies and activities in the areas of recruitment, selection and screening, career development and promotion, awareness and public relations, job accommodation, and information systems.

These measures and activities are described in detail in the First Annual Report. Though some of these were the responsibility of all departments, the lion's share seemed to fall to departments with pubic service-wide accountability: Personnel, Education, Culture and Communications.

Specific Recommendations

Pages 12 to 14 of the First Annual Report indicate a number of factors that would influence the ability of departments and the government as a whole to meet their targets. In some cases specific recommendations are made.

The government does not have an adequate *data base on labour supply*. The responsibility for providing this information falls to Advanced Education and the Bureau of Statistics.

The Department of Education is called upon to play a key role in providing *on-going educational and training programs*. There are a number of specific recommendations calling for the review of existing programs and the development of new ones.

Some of the recommendations are directed towards the government as a whole. The Directorate recognized that *housing* was a critical problem area and called for more housing and broader relocation benefits. There was a need to *review all personnel policies* and establish *human resource plans*. Finally, the Directorate made twelve specific recommendations--everything from cross-cultural seminars, to dedicated person years in each department, to implementing job sharing procedures.

Financial Considerations.

How much money was specifically allocated for implementing the Native Employment Policy?

Over the past four years the project has had a budget of between $5 million and $6 million dollars annually (see Appendix C). Included in this amount was the budget for the Equal Employment Directorate which came to a little over a million dollars annually. Undoubtedly there were additional "in kind" contributions from departments which simply absorbed some costs for the project.

Was this budget adequate to meet the target of 52% in five years set out by government at the beginning of the project?

No it wasn't.

When the departments first developed their affirmative action plans they were asked to estimate their resource requirements. They came back with a total requirement of some $39 million dollars. These requirements were reviewed by the Directorate and reduced first to $29 million, then to $21 million. In its First Annual Report the Directorate stated:

> "This figure ($21 million) represents the absolute minimum requirements to meet the obligations of the policy....Any reductions in funding will mean that this Government will not achieve the proposed target of 52% native employment in the public service." (pg. 5.)

The directorate breaks these costs out into various budget categories. (p. 5-6)

4. THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT DIRECTORATE.

As we have already seen, the Native Employment Policy created the position of the Director when it was introduced on February 2, 1985. The Directorate itself was created by the Executive Council's Record of Recommendation 85-S(6)-1 of May 1, 1985.

FUNCTIONS. The Directorate's main functions were:

- to advise senior managers and the Executive Council on the employment, training, and promotion of native people, women, and disabled persons;

people, women, and disabled persons;

- to promote affirmative action to employees, managers, and the general public;
- to coordinate the government-wide affirmative action planning and evaluating and reporting on progress in achieving it;
- promoting the Government of the Northwest Territories as an employer;
- establishing an advisory committee to assist in developing strategies to implement affirmative action.
- developing a data base of statistical information on the representation of various groups in the Public Service and availability of qualifiable members of these groups in the Northwest Territories labour force;
- to broaden its mandate to include affirmative action for women and disabled persons by April 1, 1986.

STAFFING The Directorate has 13 positions. Eight of these are located in Yellowknife, the rest are in the regions.

Staff in Yellowknife include The Executive Director, The Manager, Equal Employment, An Equal Employment Coordinator, An Equal Employment Coordinator Trainee, a Statistical Programmer, and an Executive Secretary. There are also two Equal Employment Officers located in Yellowknife but serving the Rae Edzo and Fort Simpson areas.

The remaining positions--five Employment Officer positions--are located in each one of the five regions.

OPERATIONS As we have indicated above, the Directorate carries out a number of different functions. But there are two major functions: helping departments develop their annual affirmative action plans, and providing support to departments on an on-going basis.

Each year, in preparation for the new fiscal year, the Directorate provides departments with a progress report on their affirmative action plans from the preceding year. This usually comes in the form of a statistical report indicating the extent to which departments succeeded or failed in meeting their targets. Departments then prepare their plans for the coming fiscal year.

To the extent that we can tell (we were not able to secure copies of individual affirmative action plans from the Directorate) these plans are not new plans. They are, rather, revisions to the base plan that was developed in the first year and contained a five year projection.

When it receives the departmental plans the Directorate reviews them to determine what targets have been set for the coming fiscal year and how these will be met. It may negotiate with the department to raise some of the targets; in some cases it has suggested to departments that targets may be unrealistically high in the light of past performance.

While the Directorate may suggest revisions to plans, it does not see itself as evaluating the plans to determine whether the proposed strategies will be effective. Nor does it see itself as having the power or authority to approve affirmative action plans. Its role is very much one of review and coordination.

Once all the departmental plans have been reviewed, they are collated. A report is prepared for the Minister--the Government's Affirmative Action Plan--and a Annual Report is developed and circulated to the public.

In addition to coordinating the development and review of affirmative action plans, the second major activity of the Directorate is to provide day to day support to departments. Most of this work is carried on by the Equal Employment Officers. They promote and provide information about the program both to the general public and internally to the public service. They provide counselling services to

individual native employees, and to employers. They monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of action plans and make reports to the Departments of Personnel and Education, as well as to the Directorate's headquarters in Yellowknife.

THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE. This is a committee set up to advise the Minister on affirmative action issues. Its membership includes representatives of five native organizations, two special interest groups, and two unions. Members are appointed by the Executive Council under the policy. The Committee is chaired by the Manager of Equal Employment and meets three or four times a year.

Summary

In this first chapter we began with the historical context. We saw that present policy had its roots in the work of the Task Force on Personnel Policy and the Office of Native Employment.

Then we looked at the policy itself.

The policy statement indicates that the major purpose of the policy is to overcome inequity in employment and a lack of career development opportunities within the public service.. We then examined the guiding principles and the directive which outlines accountabilities, and the role of the Director, Equal Employment Directorate.

We concluded with an overview of the program: the affirmative action plans and the support system, the costs, and the role of the Equal Employment Directorate.

CHAPTER TWO

ASSESSMENT

In this Chapter we will provide our assessment of the Native Employment Policy and the manner in which government has implemented it over the last four years.

We will see, from a brief statistical review, that the policy has not succeeded. Our real concern will be to determine the reasons why the policy failed.

The main reason for failure is the policy itself. It is seriously flawed. It appears to have been introduced with little or no serious policy analysis. As a result, the assumptions upon which it is based are invalid.

Next we will review the program--the manner in which government tried to implement the policy. Early on the project encountered some serious problems which it was never able to overcome.

1. SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

In most cases it is difficult to determine whether a particular government policy has been effective. Government policies are complex, their impacts are not always obvious, and determinations of effectiveness are open to a great deal of interpretation.

But not in this case.

When it introduced its Native Employment Policy, the GNWT tied the policy to the process of Affirmative Action--a process based upon clearly articulated, quantifiable results. To determine effectiveness we simply have to see whether the government produced the results it said it would produce.

In 1985 the GNWT stated that it would raise the level of native participation from 30% to 52% by 1990. As of January,

1989, the level of native representation was only 32%--an increase of only 2 percentage points over the past four years. ***Clearly, the Native Employment Policy has failed to meet its primary policy objective--to significantly increase the number of native people in the GNWT Public Service.***

Some departments have done better than others; and, as we might expect, there is a higher level of native representation in the regions than in Yellowknife.

In the regions native people make up a larger proportion of the population. It is possible for native people to live in their home community and take a government job, while still maintaining various aspects of a traditional lifestyle.

On the whole, the jobs are less technical in the regions than they are in Yellowknife. And it seems to be easier to implement affirmative action programs--particularly because of the coordinating role that can be played by the Regional Director. In the regions native representation in the public service workforce ranges from about 36% in the Inuvik Region to about 40% to 42% in the Kitikmeot and Keewatin Regions.

Yellowknife, with 25%of the NWT population, has about 41% of all GNWT jobs. Native representation in the GNWT Public Service is about 19%. Obviously, the inability of departments to hire native staff in Yellowknife is one of the main reasons why the overall representation of native people is so low.

In Yellowknife, native people make up a smaller proportion of the total population than they do elsewhere. It is harder to blend a government job with a traditional lifestyle. And the high cost and limited availability of housing makes it difficult for native people to move to the city to take jobs. In addition, a larger proportion of jobs are management, technical, and policy-type jobs: they require a stronger academic background and good writing skills.

As we can see, the level of success has been influenced by a wide rage of geographic, cultural and economic factors. But these factors cannot be cited as the reasons for the policy's overall failure. They were well known when the policy was introduced; they were, indeed, the reason why the policy was introduced.

As we shall see in what follows, the Native Employment Policy failed because of basic design problems in the policy itself, unrealistic expectations on the part of government, a lack of resources, and an inadequate program to support the policy.

1. PROBLEMS WITH THE POLICY

The main reason the Native Employment Policy failed is the policy itself. It is badly flawed. Its assumptions about the true nature of the problem and the length of time and resources required to deal with it are badly out of wack.

Misjudging The Real Nature of the Problem

As we saw above, the policy assumes that the reason for the lack of representation is systemic discrimination within the GNWT. Presumably, if these various forms of systemic discrimination can be removed, the objectives of the policy can be met.

In most instances of affirmative action programs around the country, assuming that the problem is systemic discrimination within organizations is a safe assumption. There are a significant number of people, usually members of identifiable groups, who have the required education and skills but can't get jobs. This is especially true in urban areas.

But it is not the case in the NWT among native peoples.

In general, Grade 10 is considered to be the absolute minimum for entry level positions in government and in the trades. But, in 1986, 63% of all native people in the NWT had less than a Grade 9 education. This fact reveals the real nature of the problem.

The main reason for the lack of native representation within the GNWT Public Service is the severe shortage of native people with the required education and skills in the general population.

It is not that native people are being kept out--as the policy suggests. It is that they can't get in.

This is not to say that there are not examples of systemic or attitudinal discrimination within the GNWT's public service. There probably are. But, the experience of the government seems to be that when qualified native people do apply for jobs, they have very good chance of getting them. The Directorate noted in its Third Annual Report that fully half of those native people within the NWT who had completed Grade 10 already worked for the GNWT. (p. 3)

If lack of education and skills--not systemic discrimination--is the real problem, (and the evidence seems to indicate overwhelmingly that it is), it is apparent why the Native Employment Policy failed. ***It was trying to solve the wrong problem.***

Though some of the plans developed over the last four years plans may have had some innovative ideas for recruitment, most of them were focused inward. They assumed that qualified people were available for the jobs (or they could become qualified with a minimum of training on the job). But, as we now see clearly, this was not the case. Even if government had succeeded in removing every example of systemic or attitudinal discrimination from every department, the number of native people would not have changed significantly--not unless something was also done about the education and skill problem.

Developing a policy to deal with the wrong problem had two disastrous consequences.

First, it diverted time money and energy away from dealing with the real problem. One can't help but ask what would have happened if most of the money and resources had been spent, instead, on programs designed to help native people get their Grade 10 and some additional skills needed for entry level positions.

Second, making such a strategic mistake in the policy itself created a great deal of confusion in the program. As we shall see, the experience has left a legacy of scepticism within the public service and probably within the native community.

Setting Impossible Targets

Why did government choose 52% as the desired level of native participation? In light of what we have already seen about education and skill requirements, why didn't it go with some more realistic figure?

The Directorate gives us the answer in its First Annual Report.

The 52% figure represents the working age population of native people in the NWT. "Working age population, rather than labour force representation, has been chosen as a target *in order to compensate for existing systemic discrimination both inside and outside the Government of the Northwest Territories' Public Service." (p. 10).* (Italics ours)

Once again we are back to the same basic issue--choosing the wrong problem to build the policy around. But the quotation from the Directorate does contain a certain logic.

If you believe that there are a large number of qualified people who want the jobs but are blocked by discrimination, then 52% is not totally out of line. Most of the ability to meet the target is within the control of government. But if

the real problem is a lack of qualified people, a problem for the most part beyond the control of government, then 52% is completely unrealistic.

Why did government only give itself five years to meet the target?

Probably for the same reason that it chose 52%--an honest belief that it could effect the required changes within a five year time frame.

But there was probably another reason. Government wanted to put the screws on. It wanted to send a clear message to its departments that results were expected in short order. The time for dilly-dallying was over.

The Problem of Inadequate Resources

When the policy was introduced in May of 1985, government had absolutely no idea about the price tag nor about what non financial resources would be required. It introduced the policy anyway.

Government then asked departments to figure out the costs. When departments asked about resources as they were developing their first Affirmative Action Plans, they were told to write in the resources they thought they would require. They came back with a figure of $39 million dollars per year.

This figure was quite unacceptable to government. It was eventually whittled down to $21 million by the Directorate--an amount the Directorate considered an "absolute minimum"(First Annual Report, p.5)

Though we have no accurate figures on the total costs of the program, (some departments simply absorbed some of the costs), we estimate that the most government spent on the policy was in the order of $5 million to $6 million dollars for any given year.

Perhaps government felt that the Directorate and the departments were grossly exaggerating the real costs of the programs. Whatever the situation, government seems to have made the mistake of introducing the policy before accurately estimating what it would cost. There can be little doubt that the program was never adequately funded.

An Inadequate Mandate and Project Design

Who was responsible for implementing the policy?

The directive is very clear on this matter. The Minister of each department is to be held responsible.

The Equal Employment Director was given responsibility to coordinate the development of plans, and was told to report progress to government. But he had very little real authority, and a rather unenviable position.

A civil servant, the Director was, in fact, being asked to report on whether Ministers, his political masters, had met their obligations. Not one of your better ways of ensuring accountability.

The relationship between the Directorate and the various departments can only be described as "cautious". The Directorate did not create any pressure upon departments to meet targets; it did everything it could to maintain their good will; and, in its monitoring role, it was an extremely reluctant policeman. (As we shall see in the next section, the Department of Personnel ended up taking on most of the policing functions, playing a sort of "Bad Cop" role to the Directorate's "Good Cop" role).

As for the project design, it was completely inadequate.

In his First Annual Report we find the Director recommending a series of absolutely essential measures--development of data bases, making more housing available, the development of education and training programs, the review of personnel systems. These measures should have been part of the project design and "in the works" before the policy was introduced.

Why did government make such critical strategic errors--about the true nature of the problem, about targets and timetables, about costs, about the kind of mandate and project design that was required?

There is only one possible explanation. The policy was introduced without an adequate policy analysis.

The Policy Analysis Failure.

Academics disagree about how government policy is actually developed. But they do agree on one thing--the need for a thorough policy analysis before introducing policy.

Policy analysis, carried out through various research and testing procedures, comes up with answers to the basic questions: the nature of the problem, its impact upon people and communities, possible solutions, resource requirements, time requirements, benefits vs costs, the best strategy for implementation.

Taking shortcuts, jumping in with both feet and trying to implement changes before the hard thinking has been done,--can have disastrous consequences. The "wrong problem" can be tackled, resources can be wasted, energies can be dissipated, frustration can set in.

That seems to be exactly what happened in the case of the Native Employment Policy.

To the extent that we can determine, very little policy analysis occurred in the months preceding the introduction of

the policy. There are no preparatory studies on the native employment situation, no comprehensive discussions on various options, no extensive consultations with stakeholders and interest groups, no project design plans.

Why not? Why did government skip the policy analysis stage altogether?

We are not sure. Perhaps government felt that the problem--the lack of native representation in the public service--was so obvious, that spending time studying it further would only delay dealing with it. Whatever the reason, failure to carry out such analysis before designing and introducing the policy was a serious mistake. In our opinion it was the main reason for the policy's failure.

3. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROGRAM

It also created real problems for the program.

Once the policy was announced, the Directorate and the departments were told to hit the ground running. But the project had not been designed properly. The resources had not been corralled. The planning groundwork had not been done. And the footing was treacherous.

During the first six months or so, some bad decisions were made. Other decisions which should have been made were not made. The project never recovered.

INADEQUATE AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS PLANS. As we have already seen, departmental affirmative action plans were supposed to have become the key to each department's affirmative action strategy. But they never became a viable management tool. Instead they were an early casualty in the pseudo war against organizational discrimination.

When the departments developed their base plans with five year targets, they spelled out the resources they would need

each year to meet those targets. But then they discovered that most of the resources they thought they would need were simply not available. They were told to do the best they could with the resources they already had.

At that point a critical mistake was made.

Departments should have been required to revise their plans to bring their targets in line with the resources that were available. *But the revisions never happened.* Nor was the corporate target--52%--modified.

Within a very short time the plan became a useless appendage that the department would drag along behind it and trot out once a year for examination. But no new life was ever breathed into it. During our interviews a number of managers described the annual tinkering with the affirmative action plan as "a simple number crunching exercise". (It is interesting the number of departments that have assigned this responsibility to the Director of Finance. Presumably it is because he or she is the most adept at crunching the numbers.)

NO HUMAN RESOURCE PLANS. In its Principle #8, the Native Employment Policy states: "Affirmative Action will be an integral part of the human resource planning process throughout the Public Service".

Originally the affirmative action plans were supposed to have been part of much more comprehensive *departmental human resource plans.* Unfortunately, four years after introduction of the policy, departments still haven't produced any human resource plans. Nor have they developed a solid human resource planning capability.

Both departments and native people have suffered the consequences.

Because departments have not been able to forecast their staffing requirements, nor plan for succession, nor help

their staff with career development alternatives in a consistent manner, they are not sure where they are going, nor how they will manage their most important resource--their staff.

With no strategic road map to guide them, departments are trying to plan for the hiring of native people without knowing how many secretaries, or supervisors, or technicians, or managers they are going to need--nor how they are going to develop their staff once they are on board. The cart is before the horse. Hiring native people becomes an end in itself rather than a means to an end.

Native people sometimes suffer the consequences.

They often feel they are being labelled--as "native staff" rather than professional employees like everyone else. That is why, in a number of cases, native people have tried to apply for jobs without "declaring themselves" under the policy--preferring to "make it on my own rather than as a native person".

Ironically, the very policy designed to help them tends to foster its own form of subtle discrimination. It is not surprising that a significant number of native people don't survive the first year. (Second Annual Report, p. 13)

NO ADEQUATE DATA BASE for human resource planning. This has been a longstanding problem within the government.

The Directorate recognized this problem early on. That's why it developed its own data base--a breakdown of the numbers of native people within departments. But this kind of data base, though it may have responded to the reporting requirements of the Directorate, is inadequate for human resource planning. Departments need information on what's happening outside government--labour supply and demand information.

Over the years some GNWT departments have developed some information that could provide the base for a human resource

information system. The Department of Education has done some work in the area of labour demand information. The Department of Personnel developed its somewhat infamous "Pingo System." The Statistics Bureau has a good deal of data on the general NWT population. But there has never been a concerted effort to pull it all together into a coordinated system suitable for human resource planning.

Had such an initiative been started four years ago, departments might now have the kinds of information they need to do serious human resource--affirmative action planning.

LACK OF MANAGEMENT SUPPORT As we have seen, departments lacked the financial resources they felt they needed to implement the policy. They also lacked management support.

Because it was unsure of its own mandate and lacked internal resources, The Directorate was not able to provide the kind of management support that was necessary in a project of this size.

Management Strategy. On a corporate level the Directorate did not develop a comprehensive, government-wide management strategy to facilitate the recruitment and hiring of native staff. (It seems to have tried, but the lack of resources undoubtedly frustrated its efforts). The lack of corporate strategy is most apparent in the areas of government-wide targets.

Early on in the project--perhaps as early as the end of the first year--the Directorate knew that the 52% level was unattainable. It made this fact known to departments. But it did not set new, more realistic targets and indicate how government could achieve these targets over two, three or four years. Thus a vacuum was created. Departments knew what they could not accomplish, but they did not know what they were expected to accomplish.

On the individual department level, the Directorate did not feel it had a mandate to critique departmental strategies

contained in the affirmative action plans. Each department was responsible for its own strategies. With no critique very little attention was paid to strategies. The emphasis switched from the strategies to the numbers.

Technical Support. The Directorate could not provide departments with technical support. It had neither the resources nor the expertise.

It did collect some information on native staff. But, as we have seen above, the kind of information was of little use for technical human resource planning.

If departments required technical expertise in human resource planning, the Directorate would refer them to the Human Resource Planning Unit in the Department of Personnel. This unit did not exist for the first several years of the project; and, with only a couple of staff, it has not had the ability to provide much support.

Ditto for training expertise. These resources were, for the most part, located in the Department of Education.

As one might expect, coordination was a real problem. We heard a number of complaints from departments during out interviews. Interestingly, one service the Directorate did develop was a sort of "office overload service"--providing departments with the names of native people available for short-term work.

LACK OF CLIENT SUPPORT. Though it was beyond the scope of our study to interview native clients about the kind of support they have received within departments, the lack of support seems to be an obvious problem. One indication of this is the relatively high turnover rate.

During 1986 The GNWT recruited 431 new staff. But during the same year it lost 161 native staff--more than 1/3 the number it recruited. In 1987 the Directorate commissioned a Pilot

Study to determine why people were quitting in such large numbers. The study, conducted by Witty Training Consultants, came up with a number of explanations. One of the most apparent was poor people support skills within departments.

Many supervisors seem to lack the skills needed to develop native staff. They feel they were hired to do a job, or supervise other fully qualified personnel to do a job,--the way it was down South. They do not consider themselves to be "trainers" and sometimes resent this part of their jobs.

Another part of this same problem is the lack of adequate orientation and training programs.

There are no consistent orientation programs for new staff across government. Many people are not sure what to expect once they start working for government; and the first few months can be a rough ride, especially for those who lack work experience.

Though a good deal of money has been dedicated to staff training, the lack of any consistent human resource planning leads us to believe that much of the training is hit and miss.

Finally, we suspect that often departments are simply unable to provide the level of support that some new native staff require. These staff are hired with minimum paper qualifications. Grade levels do not always reflect actual skill levels. And departments end up trying to provide the kind of educational support that should have been provided by the school system.

LACK OF EVALUATION. A final problem--no evaluation throughout the course of the project.

Given the lack of progress over the past four years, one would expect that government would have intervened long ago to find out what was happening (or rather, what wasn't happening.) There was no intervention. The project

desperately needed some mid-stream corrections; but it was allowed to continue without any significant changes.

Nor does government seem to see the necessity of evaluating the policy and program now.

In March, 1989, the GNWT rescinded the native Employment Policy and introduced the Affirmative Action Policy, giving it a new five year mandate. Apparently it felt that the long promised "audit and review...that would decide on the future of this Government's role in the equal employment of disadvantaged groups" (First Annual Report, p.5) was no longer necessary.

4. SECONDARY AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS

We would be remiss in our analysis if we did not acknowledge some of the secondary and potential benefits that have resulted from the policy.

SECONDARY BENEFITS. Though the GNWT did not achieve its primary goal through the Native Employment Policy--a more representative Public Service--there were some "secondary benefits."

Under the policy a significant number of native people got jobs, training and work experience. Some of these people still work for government. Others have gone on to work for other employers--the federal government, native organizations, resource industries, private sector employers.

We have no data to tell us how many native people began working with the GNWT and then were successful with other employers. We would suspect that there were a significant number.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS. Over the past four years, GNWT employees have accumulated a great deal of practical experience about how to design and introduce an affirmative action policy--and how not to do it. This experience is invaluable for a

government committed to developing a truly competent and representative public service. But it is only a ***potential*** benefit. It will be lost unless government takes time to talk to its employees--native employees as well as non-native managers and supervisor--about their experiences over the last four years.

In reviewing the Native Employment Policy we would advise government to concentrate on some of the successes rather than the failures. There have been several highly innovative programs that require a closer look.

Over the past five years the Regional Directors in the Baffin Region developed and fostered a three year Management Training Program for Inuit managers. The program is small, with only about 10 students involved so far. But the drop-out rate is very low and the success rate seems to have been quite high. This program represents a long-term commitment on the part of the region to developing a management cadre which is both representative and competent.

In the Kitikmeot Region, beginning in 1983 (before the policy was introduced), the then Regional Director developed a comprehensive program to help native people secure and maintain jobs. Called "KRISP" (for Kitikmeot Region In-Service Program), the program introduced a basic office training program, pulled together a range of support services, hustled necessary resources such as housing and training slots, emphasized a team spirit among students, developed a sophisticated reward and recognition system, and mobilized cooperation and enthusiasm across departmental boundaries. The program seems to have been quite successful.

These programs require a closer look. They may be able to be duplicated in other areas. And they raise a significant policy issue about the role of Regional Directors in the design and implementation of affirmative action programs.

5. THE CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE

By way of a conclusion to this chapter, a few words about the challenge for the future.

If the GNWT wants to develop a truly representative and competent public service, it will have to deal with the real problem--the lack of qualified job applicants out in the community. Something must be done to reverse the very high drop-out rate among native high school students. Some new kinds of training programs must be designed to prepare residents for government jobs.

At present government departments often compete with one another for the few available native candidates. The competition will get worse because there are several new players on the scene--the native organizations.

With the settlement of land claims and the development of local and regional administrative structures, native organizations will have a large demand for office staff and trained managers and administrators. The Inuit and the Dene-Metis are well aware of this fact. Both groups have set up planning bodies to define their staffing requirements and develop training programs.

There is every possibility--unless something is done--that the native organizations will try to use the GNWT departments as a prime recruiting and training ground for their own staffing requirements. This requires a strategy.

Rather than just sitting back and watching the staff it has trained get hired away; rather than wasting its time on bidding wars; the GNWT should join with the native organizations to develop cooperative, long-term human resource planning strategies.

In the area of staffing and training, both the government and the native organizations have common needs and common interests. They require the same kinds of staff with many of the same skills. A cooperative approach is the only one that makes sense.

Summary

In this chapter we provided our assessment.

We have seen that the Native Employment Policy has failed as a policy. We have traced the reasons for failure to problems with the policy itself and with the program designed to support the policy. Most of these problems were the result of inadequate policy analysis upfront.

In the second half of the chapter we took a look at some of the secondary and potential benefits of the policy. We concluded with a look at the new threat on the immediate horizon--serious competition from native organizations for qualified native staff.

CHAPTER THREE

THE LEGACY OF PERCEPTIONS

Has the Native Employment Policy had a beneficial effect upon public servants and departments?

Do they support the intent of the policy--the hiring of more native staff?

Or is there a negative attitude towards the policy and the hiring of more native staff?

These were the questions the Special Committee wanted answers to when it asked us, in the terms of reference for this study, to "describe the impact of the policy on the Public Service."

The answers are critical. If public servants--especially those working at the middle and upper management levels--are opposed to the intent of the policy, it will be extremely difficult for government to develop a truly representative public service.

To find the answer to these questions we asked two straightforward question during our interviews.

"Do you feel that there is *general support* for the Native Employment Policy within your department? If the answer is no, what are the major reasons for the negative reactions."

We were surprised at the number of times we got exactly the same answer.

"There is support for the policy,--but not for the way it has been implemented."

In this chapter, "Legacy of Perceptions", we will outline four major issues which summarize some of the negative perceptions that have arisen because of the way government went about trying to implement the policy. In the final chapter we will recommend ways of dealing with these issues.

The Legacy Of A Failed Experiment

Before describing the perceptions of some managers about the Native Employment Policy, a brief word about how we intend to deal with the perceptions.

During our interviews with managers, most of them shared with us some of their negative perceptions about the way government has gone about implementing the policy.

Because of the limited scope of our study--we did not conduct a thorough, scientific, attitude survey--we were not able to determine a) how widespread these perceptions are within the Public Service or, b) whether they accurately reflect the real situation.

Despite the lack of hard "scientific evidence" we decided to report these perceptions anyway--going to the extent of devoting a whole chapter to them.

We have done this for three reasons.

First, though we do not know how accurate these perceptions are, nor the extent to which they are shared among departmental managers as a whole, we do know that the perceptions were shared by a significant number of the people we interviewed. They are more than just office gossip, or the complaints of a few disgruntled employees. We suspect, from our sample, that the issues described in this chapter are fairly widespread throughout the GNWT Public Service.

Second, as most elected officials fully realize, it doesn't really matter whether perceptions accurately represent reality. (If they did, we wouldn't need affirmative action programs). In the last analysis what matters is whether the people who hold certain opinions *think* they represent reality. Because government is completely dependant upon its public service to implement any kind of affirmative action program, it is imperative that government know what its employees think about the creation of a fully representative public service.

Third, if government still intends to develop a representative public service--and the recent introduction of the Affirmative Action Policy indicates that it does--it cannot do it by simply ignoring the past and charging full-steam-ahead with a new mandate. It will have to retrace its steps--evaluate the last four years to determine whether the issues outlined in this chapter are real issues. If they are, they will have to be dealt with head on and resolved.

In a word, we are presenting these issues because, in our opinion, they are the "stuff" of the kind of policy analysis that should proceed any attempts to implement the new Affirmative Action Policy.

The Accountability Issue

During our interviews we wanted to determine how serious managers were about implementing the Native Employment Policy--where it stood in the department's list of priorities.

Usually you can get some sense of the level of commitment by asking a question about accountability. So we asked the managers, "What happens if you don't meet your annual targets?" In almost all cases we got a one word answer: "Nothing."

It became quite clear to us that there was very little accountability for the Native Employment Policy within government or within individual departments. (By accountability we mean "the obligation to answer for fulfilling responsibilities that flow from the authority that is given. People must explain their decisions, the consequences of decisions, and their use of resources.") In light of what we have seen above about the problems with the policy and the program, it is understandable why there was not more accountability. But we also noticed a number of other things.

The ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the policy--as the directive points out so precisely--rests with the Minister. In every other jurisdiction in the country there is a Public Service Commission (or its equivalent)--a mechanism outside government to report on government's progress and help hold it accountable. There is no such commission in the Territories. This left the job to "the opposition"--a limited option in a consensus form of government--or to the government itself. Since the policy was so high profile politically, it became difficult for government to criticise itself.

Deputy Ministers could have been held more accountable. But this became difficult after they were denied resources. Besides, they were some distance away from the action and they quickly came to realize the real nature of the problem--a lack of qualified native people applying for jobs.

During the project there was in interesting shift in terms of accountability. As the accountability vacuum grew, the Department of Personnel stepped in and became the champion of the policy. Accountability shifted from individual departments to the Department of Personnel.

This shift was "legitimized" in October of 1987 when a Personnel Administrative Circular (SC-46-87) was issued by the Deputy Minister of Personnel and distributed to all other deputy ministers The first paragraph of this circular states: "The interpretation of the Native Employment Policy is the Responsibility of the Personnel Department and its Officers involved with the staffing process."

The circular is interesting. It only referred to "interpretation" and was not intended to remove accountability from deputy ministers. But that seems to be what it did. It gave the responsibility to interpret the policy--a significant responsibility--not to the Minister of Personnel, nor even to the Deputy Minister, but to "the Personnel Department and its Officers involved in Staffing."

As one might expect, this move has led to some classic confrontations between the Department of Personnel and other departments. Many of these have been fought over the issue of competency.

The Competency Issue

A significant number of managers in various departments believe that the Department of Personnel is deliberately using the classification and staffing processes to facilitate the hiring of native staff.

It is bending the rules: forcing down the classification levels thus trading away competency requirements to make more jobs available to native people; manipulating the hiring process in favour of native people.

Is this really happening? We don't know. But it is perceived to be happening. And the reaction is predictable. Managers are fighting back through both the classification and staffing processes. Part of the fight is against what has become popularly known as the "competency gap theory".

According to this theory, there is a skill vacuum that can develop between entry level positions and middle management or, less often, between middle management positions and senior management.

According to the "competency gap theory", if you hire too many staff with minimal qualifications, and end up with some who slip through without even the minimal qualifications, you have a serious problem on your hands. Your staff don't have the skills to handle the workload or cover the complete requirements of their job descriptions. Thus a "competency gap" is created. The manager has to jump into the breach and do the employees job as well as his or her own job. Often, the manager's boss, who wants to see more native staff in the department, doesn't want to see a reduction in efficiency. The next step...Burnout City.

(The consequences are even more drastic for the native staff person who has entered a department with minimum qualifications. He or she finds himself or herself in a competitive environment: most of the other employees are trying to get better jobs and "make it up the ladder". But the native person with only the minimum qualifications is at a strict disadvantage. The playing field is not level: and he or she doesn't have the skills to make it into the ranks of management. There is a competency gap; and the native person is "dead-ended" on the wrong side.)

Most managers are well aware of the competency gap. Rather than risk getting a classification level that creates such a gap or is too low to attract good candidates, some managers are deliberately inflating the competency requirements when they submit a job for classification.

They know they won't get the classification level that they want--at least not on the first go round. But that doesn't matter. The whole thing is a game and the "winner" is the best negotiator. But you have to learn to play the game. If you make the mistake of submitting the job to classification with the actual qualification levels required by the job, you have no room to negotiate once the job comes back with a lower level than you need. Your goose is cooked.

There are similar games in the staffing area.

Some managers believe that personnel officers will always go for the candidate with the minimum qualifications--or will insist that even unqualified native people get an interview, simply because they applied. (It has happened; but we are informed by Personnel that it is not the standard procedure) So, the managers go for the best qualified candidate. This leaves room for manoeuvring. If they have to compromise, they will at least get their second or third choice.

Are these perceptions of personnel officers fair? Probably not.

Some jobs do pay too much--a frequent complaint especially from small business men in the north who can't match government salaries.

Some classifications are higher than one finds in other jurisdictions, or in large industry, even when compensating for the higher standard of living in the north.

Classification itself is not an exact science, especially in a department that experiences a fair rate of turnover and is part of a relatively young government.

And as for the personnel staff themselves--the devolution process has created a staggering workload. For many months, personnel managers and officers have been trying to cope with totally unrealistic demands.

Perhaps the complaints are not fair. But the issue is not about fairness. It is about perceptions of fairness. The Department is perceived not to be fair because it is perceived as being required to "champion" the cause of the Native Employment Policy

How can this situation be turned around?

Moving the staffing function into departments would help. So would moving the staff development function back out of the Department of Education--but more about this later. (Some accommodation would have to be made for small departments or units that could not justify their own staffing and human resource development function.)

Establishing a more professional approach to classification with a much greater emphasis upon pay equity research would also help.

Even more helpful--and essential in our opinion--would be to put the accountability for the hiring of native staff where it belongs--either with the Minister and with the Deputy Minister, or with some kind of clearly defined shared accountability with Regional Directors. Take the burden away from Personnel and put it where it belongs.

(In our opinion, switching accountability for the hiring of native staff from departments and placing it on the already overburdened shoulders of staffing officers--in the hope that the ailing policy could somehow be restored to health--was a bit like trying to perform an appendectomy on a man carrying a piano up a staircase. It was the wrong treatment for the wrong patient.)

The steps we have just proposed would help improve the present climate. But they would not in themselves be enough. Something must be done about the objectivity issue.

The Objectivity Issue

There is a very strong perception among the managers we interviewed that Ministers of Personnel intervene directly in the hiring process. And when they do intervene, they always seem to intervene on behalf of native staff--never on behalf of non-native staff.

No one has a problem when a Minister, along with the Government Leader, hires his or her own Deputy Minister. It is well understood that department heads serve "at the favour" of the Minister.

But when the Minister's influence is perceived to reach down into the ranks--to the middle management or entry level positions--it creates the impression that public service jobs are patronage appointments. As the popular saying has it, it then becomes a matter of "who you know rather than what you know".

Does this happen all the time? Do ministers actually exert this much personal influence over appointments either directly or through instructions given to staff in the Department of Personnel?

No they don't.

But it only has to happen a couple of times, with the attendant publicity in the local papers--and it has happened a couple of times over the life of the Native Employment Policy--for the perception to take hold that race, not competence, is what gets you a job in the government. (The fact that many native people may have had this same perception for decades does not soften the resentment.)

Why can't a Minister of Personnel, of any other minister for that matter, intervene occasionally to ensure that a government policy such as the Native Employment Policy is properly implemented? Isn't that what Ministers are supposed to do--ensure that government policy is being properly implemented?.

Normally, yes. In the case of hiring practise, no.

Since government policies are essentially "political" in nature, it is extremely difficult for a Minister of Personnel to intervene in a competition--even when correcting a real injustice--without creating the impression that a judgement in favour of one candidate is not a "political decision".

Once the perception takes hold that jobs are acquired on the basis of political will rather than merit (even recognizing that affirmative action programs under Section 15(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act allowing for exceptions to the merit principle), the credibility of the whole personnel process is thrown into questions.

(We note with some concern that the new Affirmative Action Policy will not help in this regard. It seems to go out of its way to spell out the right of the Minister to intervene directly under the policy. Rather than simply listing the Ministers responsibility under the "Authority and Accountability" section--the common practise--the Directive also mentions the Minister under section 3, "Employment, Training and Promotion" Paragraph 3.d reads: "*Where warranted, special circumstances will be reviewed on a case by case basis by the Minister of Personnel*"(3.d) Since the

policy does not define "special circumstances" this paragraph seems to permit the Minister to intervene directly in all matters of employment, training, and promotion at his or her own discretion.)

How can this perception of a lack of objectivity be dealt with?.

In our opinion there is only one way. The GNWT should do what every other jurisdiction in the country has found it necessary to do--create a Public Service Commission. This suggestion was put forward to government in the 1989 Budget Session of the Legislative Assembly and, at the time of this writing, is presently "under consideration".

We should note that there is nothing magic about Public Service Commissions, nor have they always been free from political influence. But that is now somewhat academic.

We have reached the stage in the development of the NWT where a growing number of people consider a Public Service Commission absolutely necessary. Though government may propose its own unique version of a PSC, anything less than a bone fide Public Service Commission will be suspect.

The Reverse-Discrimination Issue

Every affirmative action program has to contend with charges of reverse-discrimination: complaints from those not in the target population that the program discriminates against their rights or puts them at a disadvantage. The charges take many forms--lawsuits, labour grievances, sometimes a strong undercurrent of bitterness and resentment. An employer ignores these charges and feelings at great risk.

During our interviews we detected a sense of reverse-discrimination, mostly around the issue of further education and training.

In the NWT as elsewhere, job benefits and quality of work life have become almost as important as salary. One of the most important benefits for many pubic servants is the opportunity for training, further education, and, in general the opportunity to improve one's skills and abilities. Among many people, further education is a "perk": a reward for years of service. It also enhances the opportunity for promotion.

There is a perception among some employees that significant training--and educational leave in particular--is only available to non-native people.

One hears the complaints--especially among managers--that they are not allowed to "travel out" for courses; but native people seem to have no trouble getting such permissions.

A particular bone of contention is the way allocations are made for education and training programs for public servants.

If one examines the criteria--especially those for educational leave--it is apparent that they are directed toward "levelling the playing field". The less education you have, the better your chances; numbers of years of service to the government do not carry as much weight as numbers of years of residency in the NWT.

The criteria, and recent practice, foster the perception that much more funding is proportionately available for native staff than for non-native staff. (As one manager put it to us: "I've given this government twelve years of dedicated service. I've risen to a senior management position. But when it comes to further education, I don't stand a chance competing against a person with one year's service who was born and raised in the N.W.T. Something is wrong somewhere.")

Because we heard this complaint a number of times we "looked it up".

Here are the statistics we received from Department of Education.

TRAINING/EDUCATION PROGRAMS FOR GNWT EMPLOYEES

NUMBER OF PERSONS EMPLOYED/PARTICIPATING

PROGRAM	1986-87	1987-88	1988-89
Education Leave	40	34	45
Native	25	23	37
Non-native	15	11	8
In-Service Training	79	83	97
Native	73	74	88
Non-native	6	9	9
GNWT In-Service Apprenticeship	63	68	64
Native	58	60	60
non-native	5	8	4
Training on the Job*			155
Native			134
Non-native			21

* April 1, 1987 to October 15, 1988

What kinds of conclusions can we draw from these statistics?

One would expect that an affirmative action program would give preference in training to target group members. That in itself is not unusual.

We can not conclude that the figures by themselves demonstrate a form of reverse discrimination. (It would help our assessment if we knew the total number of applicants that applied and were turned down; or the number that felt there was no sense in applying because they felt they would be turned down.)

But the figures do seem to demonstrate that GNWT education and training allocations are weighted against non-native people. And it is just a short hop from there to feelings of discrimination.

Obviously the way to turn this situation around is to review education and training policy in the light of the government's overall public service requirements. Ways must be found to prioritize--without robbing Peter to Pay Paul.

In summary, this chapter has outlined the real challenge facing the Government of the Northwest Territories: dealing with the issues of accountability, competency, objectivity and reverse-discrimination. We are optimistic that government can confront these issues and deal with them constructively.

Though many civil servants are quite vocal about their concerns, we were impressed, during out interviews, by the number we talked to who have a strong sense of social justice. They are tired of playing what they called "the silly games". But they support the policy of affirmative action. They are still committed to developing a representative public service--not because it is more efficient, but because it is right.

CHAPTER FOUR

RECOMMENDATIONS

In presenting our recommendations we are mindful of the requirements for recommendations spelled out in original terms of reference for this study.

The recommendations must be *strategic:* broad-based, dealing with the core issues, and directed towards the future.

And, they must *relate to the mandate* of the Special Committee on the Northern Economy--to create a long term economic development strategy.

To fulfill its mandate the Special Committee must develop for government an economic vision of the future. We do not pretend that this kind of study can provide that vision. But perhaps it can provide part of that vision.

As we reviewed the history and development of the Native Employment Policy, as we thought about the past, the present and the future, we were struck by certain realities which, together, form a sort of context for our recommendations.

1. THE CONTEXT FOR RECOMMENDATIONS

The Past

Our review of the Native Employment Policy over the past four years has taught us two important lessons.

Lesson #1 You can't achieve social and organizational change through political will alone. You need to develop a cooperative approach, based upon trust,--one that motivates political leaders and public servants to work together for a common goal.

Lesson #2 You can't develop one target group within the public service and neglect the rest of the public service. You can concentrate on a target group, but you have to develop the whole of the public service at the same time.

The Present

As we moved from office to office asking questions, it was hard not to be overwhelmed by the blur of activities and the signs of technological change.

Almost overnight whole new mandates and responsibilities for services are being transferred from the Federal Government to the Territorial Government.

New departments are slicing away from older ones, popping up suddenly like icebergs calving during a spring thaw. There is the usual jumble of confusion prior to sorting out new mandates and operating procedures.

Old systems and structures are beginning to crack at the seams as they try to absorb new functions; new systems and structures are hurriedly being designed to replace them. The signs of new technologies--computers, fax machines, and new information systems--are everywhere.

And many civil servants feel that they are loosing ground. They are running flat out--but they are not managing to keep up.

If there is a lesson in this jumble of confusion it seems to be this one: that it is people--not policies, structures, money, and technologies--that are the government's most valuable asset.

Like all governments, the GNWT is in the business of serving people. But only people can serve other people.

The only real way to deliver better services is to invest major resources in developing better people, and finding better ways to do it.

The Future

Isaac Asimov once said: "The future ain't what it used to be." His words have special relevance for the GNWT as it contemplates its future.

The future used to be more certain. The NWT was walking down the road to provincehood. Now that future is very uncertain. But we are sure about two things.

First, the GNWT's major challenge in the immediate future is a constitutional challenge. It will have to be a prime mover in creating new forms of public government that give full recognition to the collective rights and interests of aboriginal peoples, while at the same time protecting the individual rights of all northern residents.

(It is this challenge which makes the GNWT unique. And, since the provinces have never been down this road, government can't use the rear view mirror to drive into the future.)

Second, this challenge can not be met by political will alone. The GNWT must have complete confidence in the loyalty, competence, and commitment of its public service. It can only have this by looking ahead and creating the kind of public service it thinks it will need.

2. THE RECOMMENDATIONS

There are five recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION #1: THAT THE GNWT SET UP A SPECIAL COMMISSION TO CONDUCT A COMPLETE REVIEW OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

Government can't develop a "competent public service representative of the population it serves" unless it has a much better idea of what it means by competence now and in the decade to come.

The review should cover all aspects of the public service especially: the relationship between the leader of the government and his deputy ministers, and well as their accountabilities; staff development requirements, especially orientation programs and training which is competency based; the development and training of managers; personnel policies and procedures; labour-management relations; and last but not least, affirmative action programs.

The commission need not be large. (One to three persons should be adequate.) But it must have a comprehensive mandate, have adequate staff resources, and be politically neutral.

RECOMMENDATION #2: THAT THE GNWT ESTABLISH A PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AND REORGANIZE THE PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS.

There is no need to repeat the rationale for a Public Service Commission. It has been discussed at length. However we do wish to focus attention on the second part of this recommendation--the reorganization of personnel functions.

The development of a public service commission will require a reorganization of all major personnel functions. This presents some exciting opportunities for the GNWT. While we do not wish to recommend what this reorganization should look like, we would do hope government will at least consider the following options.

The Public Service Commission would report to the Legislative Assembly (as opposed to the government itself.) It would have the mandate for ensuring the merit principle, overseeing affirmative action, and handling appeals related to both merit and affirmative action. It would also monitor staffing and possibly coordinate the delivery of competency-based training (but not deliver it).

The present Financial Management Board would be turned into a Board of Management. It would have two secretariats reporting to it: a Financial Secretariat, handling all the financial management and accounting responsibilities; and a Human Resource Secretariat, responsible for personnel management.

The Human Resource Secretariat, in addition to the usual responsibilities of Board support and communication with departments, would have responsibilities for: collective bargaining, classification, policies on long-term staffing requirements and human resource planning , administrative policies relating to personnel functions, review of departmental organizations, senior management appraisals and career development, personnel research, etc.

Each department would handle its own staffing within a human resource unit. The unit would also handle human resource planning, writing and processing of job descriptions, monitoring of appraisals, and staff development, including training. Some accommodation would have to be made for very small departments or management units not large enough to support their own human resource unit. In the regions it might be advisable to pool some resources under the direction of the Regional Directors.

The Department of Personnel would no longer exist as a separate entity.

The Department of Education would no longer have any responsibility for the training of public servants. But the Arctic College would still run longer-term degree programs (Social Work, Business Admin. etc) and might be requested to provide training programs on contract.

The Public Service Act would be reviewed and amended.

RECOMMENDATION #3. THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCT AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIVE EMPLOYMENT POLICY.

Over the past four years the GNWT has spent a minimum of $20 million dollars on its Native Employment Policy. The size of the expenditure alone argues the need for thorough evaluation. There are many other reasons for the evaluation. Most of them have been outlined at some length in this study.

The Terms of Reference for the Evaluation should be broad enough to include: the gathering and assessment of information on the experience of native people who have been working with the GNWT; an assessment of the reasons why other native people have quit the government; skill development requirements at the entry level; human resource systems; recruitment programs and upgrading programs to prepare people for government service.

The evaluation should concentrate on the positive experiences and not waste time detailing past failures. In particular it should review in depth some of the more innovative approaches developed over the past four years.

In this study we have seen what happens when a new policy is designed and introduced without adequate policy analysis. *The implementation of the new Affirmative Action Policy should be placed on hold until the results and recommendations are in from the evaluation of the Native Employment Policy.*

RECOMMENDATION #4: THAT THE GNWT DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A HUMAN RESOURCE INFORMATION AND PLANNING SYSTEM

The information system should include both internal information, on GNWT employees, as well as external information on labour supply and demand.

Part of the requirements should be met by the new Human Resource Information System presently being developed by the

Department of Personnel to replace the PINGO system. This new system should be on stream by the summer.

The rest of the system--the labour supply and demand component--needs to be developed and linked to the Human Resource Information System. Since it will be a prime system for a number of departments--Education, Economic Development and Tourism, the Statistics Bureau and perhaps even Social Services--it should be developed cooperatively under the leadership of the Statistics Bureau and Computer Services.

The Human Resource Planning component has been under development for several years. It has very few resources and has been fighting to find acceptance within departments.

Government should require departments to develop annual human resource plans by a fixed date. Contained within these plans should be an affirmative action component. (Note: departments should be required to develop human resource plans before they are required to develop affirmative action plans.) The plans should be revised annually and submitted along with operational plans, capital plans,etc.

The resource requirements for human resource plans--both centralized and within departments--should be carefully assessed. No resources, no plans.

RECOMMENDATION #5: THAT THE GNWT ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MAJOR NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS TO DEVELOP COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES FOR RECRUITING AND DEVELOPING NATIVE STAFF.

Both the GNWT and the native organizations have an immediate and longer term need for trained native staff. Since government's requirements are so similar to those of the native organizations, it makes sense to share resources and plan cooperatively. The alternative is to continually compete with one another--which would be counter productive.

The GNWT should negotiate the development of cooperative longer term human resource plans with the major native organizations.

The plans--developed on the basis of some contractual arrangement--should outline longer term staffing requirements, establish standards, cover classification and pay levels, define training programs and curricula, spell out recruitment strategies, recommend promotional campaigns, define financial and other resource requirements, and establish cost-sharing arrangements. The plans should be developed under some kinds of mutually acceptable committees or boards, and they should define the respective responsibilities of staff from the participating organizations.

While the human resource plans must concentrate upon the internal requirements of the GNWT and the native organizations, they should be broad enough to conduct research into, and devise strategies for stemming the flow of high school dropouts from the school system.

APPENDIX A

THE NATIVE EMPLOYMENT POLICY

Northwest Territories Policy

11.15
NATIVE EMPLOYMENT

The Government of the Northwest Territories is committed to a Public Service that is competent and representative of the population it serves. To that end, the Government of the Northwest Territories will support and foster equity in employment and career development of aboriginal peoples indigenous to the Northwest Territories.

PRINCIPLES

1. The objective of the Government of the Northwest Territories is to establish a Public Service able to communicate in the recognized aboriginal languages of the Northwest Territories and reflecting the cultural composition of the population it serves.

2. Aboriginal peoples indigenous to the Northwest Territories will have equal access to employment, training and promotional opportunities in the Government of the Northwest Territories Public Service.

3. It is the responsibility of the Government of the Northwest Territories to encourage and facilitate the recruitment, hiring, training and promotion of aboriginal peoples indigenous to the Northwest Territories.

4. It is the responsibility of each aboriginal person, with the assistance of the Government of the Northwest Territories, to plan and initiate actions to take advantage of employment, training and promotional opportunities in the Territorial Public Service.

5. The Government of the Northwest Territories will take a leadership role in the development of Affirmative Action programs.

6. The Government of the Northwest Territories Public Service will institute an Affirmative Action program for aboriginal peoples indigenous to the Northwest Territories in order to meet this objective.

7. Affirmative Action will be an integral part of the human resource planning process throughout the Public Service.

Commissioner and
Chairman of the Executive Council
85-02-18

References

For elaboration of this policy refer to Directive.

Northwest Territories Directive

NATIVE EMPLOYMENT

SCOPE

This Directive applies to all departments and agencies of the Government of the Northwest Territories and to the aboriginal peoples indigenous to the Northwest Territories who are employed with or are seeking employment with the Government of the Northwest Territories Public Service.

DEFINITIONS

1. Affirmative Action

   Affirmative Action is a results-oriented approach to increasing the representation, within the Government of the Northwest Territories, of groups previously disadvantaged with respect to education and employment.

2. Career Development

   Career development refers to a variety of measures to provide aboriginal peoples with the necessary skills to enable them to qualify for employment and career advancement and may include:

   (a) on-the-job training, job rotations, special assignments or secondments;

   (b) sponsorship of special development programs or grants made available for community-based education (e.g., external educational institutions such as universities, colleges, technical training institutes, adult education programs).

3. Human Resource Planning

   Means the analysis and planning required to ensure the effective recruitment, assignment and utilization of people so as to benefit both the organization and the individuals employed. It involves the means through which employee potential can be identified, developed and fully utilized.

4. Aboriginal Person

   Means any person who is a descendant of the Dene, Inuit or Metis peoples, and is indigenous to the Northwest Territories.

5. Public Service

   Means the Public Service of the Northwest Territories as defined by the Public Service Ordinance.

6. Representative

Means the degree to which the distribution of aboriginal peoples in the Government of the Northwest Territories Public Service reflects their distribution in the resident population of the Northwest Territories.

7. Systemic Barriers

Means any system, policy or practice which differentiates between aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples or which is improperly or inconsistently applied so as to deny opportunities for employment, training and promotion to aboriginal peoples.

8. Affirmative Action Advisory Committee

Means a committee established by the Executive Council composed of management, union and native organizations that provides advice to the Minister.

9. Affirmative Action Plans

Means a plan developed by department heads for the employment of aboriginal people to ensure equality of opportunity at all employment levels and to provide for the implementation of those special measures necessary to ensure results.

PROVISIONS

1. Authority and Accountability

(a) Executive Council

(i) Sets priorities and approves native employment policy.

(b) Minister Responsible for Equal Employment

(i) Approves overall Affirmative Action strategy for the Government of the Northwest Territories.

(ii) Is responsible for representing the Executive Council on Affirmative Action matters to external agencies.

(c) Ministers of Departments and Agencies

(i) Shall be accountable for the development and implementation of Affirmative Action plans for their departments.

(d) Director, Equal Employment Directorate

(i) Recommends overall Affirmative Action strategies to the Minister responsible for Equal Employment.

(ii) Chairs an Affirmative Action Advisory Committee with representation from unions, management and under-represented groups.

(iii) Co-ordinates service-wide Affirmative Action planning for the Government of the Northwest Territories Public Service.

(iv) Provides advice and assistance to Deputy Ministers on the design and implementation of departmental Affirmative Action plans.

(v) Evaluates and reports progress in achieving Affirmative Action objectives.

(vi) Establishes a data base on under-represented groups in the Government of the Northwest Territories Public Service. The Director will make available information required by departments for Affirmative Action Planning.

(e) Deputy Ministers and Headquarters Directors, Heads of Agencies

(i) Develops Affirmative Action plans in consultation with an officer of the Equal Employment Directorate.

(ii) Consults with Regional Directors in the development of Affirmative Action plans.

(iii) Implements Affirmative Action plans within their departments.

(iv) Provides Affirmative Action progress reports to the Equal Employment Directorate as required.

(f) Regional Directors

(i) Develops Affirmative Action plans in consultation with an officer of the Equal Employment Directorate.

(ii) Consults with Deputy Ministers in the development of Affirmative Action plans.

(iii) Implements Affirmative Action plans within their regions.

(iv) Provides Affirmative Action progress reports to the Equal Employment Directorate as required.

2. Prerogative of Executive Council

Nothing in this Directive shall in any way be construed to limit the prerogative of the Executive Council to make decisions to take action, respecting Affirmative Action for other under-represented groups, or any actions outside the provisions of this Directive.

Commissioner and
Chairman of the Executive Council

85-02-18

APPENDIX B

STATISTICS

TABLE 1
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES PUBLIC SERVICE

DEPARTMENT	ACTUAL (DEC 85)			PLAN 86			ACTUAL (DEC 86)			PLAN 87			ACTUAL (DEC 87)			PLAN 88			ACTUAL (DEC 88)		
	TOTAL # OF POSIT	NATIVES #	NATIVES %	TOTAL # OF POSIT	NATIVES #	NATIVES %	TOTAL # OF POSIT	NATIVES #	NATIVES %	TOTAL # OF POSIT	NATIVES #	NATIVES %	TOTAL # OF POSIT	NATIVES #	NATIVES %	TOTAL # OF POSIT	NATIVES #	NATIVES %	TOTAL # OF POSIT	NATIVES #	NATIVES %
EXECUTIVE	121	37	31%	123	45	37%	123	44	36%	122	51	42%	122	50	41%	124	55	44%	151	47	31%
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMELY	16	5	31%	16	6	38%	16	6	38%	16	7	44%	16	7	44%	16	8	50%	16	6	38%
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SECRETARIAT	19	0	0%	20	1	5%	20	0	0%	20	2	10%	20	2	10%	21	4	19%	NA	NA	NA
PERSONNEL	68	20	29%	71	25	35%	79	26	33%	80	32	40%	83	29	35%	82	39	48%	94	32	34%
FINANCE	112	17	15%	123	22	18%	123	18	15%	126	24	19%	131	26	20%	131	27	21%	142	26	18%
GOVERNMENT SERVICES	231	34	15%	241	47	20%	249	43	17%	264	64	24%	264	64	24%	264	91	34%	210	53	25%
CULTURE & COMMUNICATIONS	84	26	31%	110	50	45%	94	44	47%	135	74	55%	109	50	46%	127	60	47%	123	49	40%
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT DIRECTORATE	10	9	90%	10	9	90%	10	7	70%	12	9	75%	12	9	75%	12	9	75%	12	10	83%
MUNICIPAL AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS	163	39	24%	173	52	30%	165	37	22%	176	47	27%	176	48	27%	178	55	31%	166	31	19%
PUBLIC WORKS & HIGHWAYS	588	209	36%	588	220	37%	600	223	37%	609	243	40%	638	203	32%	613	231	38%	623	232	37%
SOCIAL SERVICES	345	131	38%	361	150	42%	382	142	37%	396	162	41%	353	137	39%	385	159	41%	375	154	41%
RENEWABLE RESOURCES	141	38	27%	148	45	30%	153	40	26%	154	42	27%	257	81	32%	250	90	36%	237	62	26%
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & TOURISM	120	27	23%	130	33	25%	120	28	23%	121	34	28%	122	25	20%	124	41	33%	125	35	28%
EDUCATION	555	302	54%	574	324	56%	661	342	52%	645	351	54%	645	351	54%	653	357	55%	535	339	63%
EDUCATION (Teach. Train. & App.)	846	221	26%	845	244	29%	908	212	23%	959	225	23%	959	225	23%	958	225	23%	845	215	25%
EDUCATION (Arctic College)																			155	25	16%
JUSTICE	134	4	3%	142	17	12%	139	6	4%	144	18	13%	145	6	4%	145	9	6%	153	12	8%
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD	52	2	4%	50	9	18%	51	2	4%	49	6	12%	52	4	8%	52	9	17%	46	7	15%
HEALTH	67	3	4%	69	12	17%	77	6	8%	71	16	23%	77	5	6%	77	13	17%	115	10	9%
N.W.T. HOUSING CORPORATION	128	12	9%	156	60	38%	137	18	13%	149	42	28%	170	26	15%	170	36	21%	163	33	20%
N.W.T. PUBLIC SERVICE TOTAL :	3800	1136	30%	3950	1371	35%	4107	1244	30%	4248	1449	34%	4351	1348	31%	4382	1518	35%	4286	1378	32%
Permanent Seasonal Employees :																					
PUBLIC WORKS & HIGHWAYS																					
RENEWABLE RESOURCES													139	106	76%				184	149	81%
T O T A L	3800	1136	30%	3950	1371	35%	4107	1244	30%	4248	1449	34%	4490	1454	32%	4382	1518	35%	4470	1527	34%

Commentary on Statistical Data

During our research a number of persons interviewed questioned the accuracy of the data (on the preceding page) provided by the Equal Employment Directorate. There were also questions about how to interpret the data. Because it was outside our terms of reference we did not conduct a thorough review of the data base or the manner in which data has been gathered. However, even a cursory glance revealed a number of problems.

NUMBER OF STAFF: The data provided by the Directorate shows that between December 1985 and December 1989, 486 new staff joined the government. Of this number, 242 were native staff. On this basis it would seem that the policy was somewhat effective: 1 out of every 2 new staff hired--50%--were native staff.

However, even though the preceding chart seems to indicate the total number of GNWT public servants, it doesn't.

In September, 1986, 177 positions were transferred to the GNWT from the Federal Government as Part of the Baffin Phase 2 Health Transfer. An additional 500 plus positions were transferred in April 1988 when the health transfer was completed. Unfortunately, and for reasons unclear to us, these positions have been excluded from the Directorate's data base.

The additional positions will undoubtedly lower the actual percentage of native staff. Though the results cannot blamed on the policy--since the positions came in from outside--they do question the accuracy of the data base.

PERCENTAGE INCREASE. There is similar confusion about the baseline establishing the number of native staff at the beginning of the project. In a number of published accounts the Directorate established the percentage of native staff at 25% in September, 1989. This would give an increase of 7% by December of 1989. In recent conversations with the Directorate however, we were informed that this number was in error.

The actual base in 1985 was 30% and the number of native staff was at 32% in 1989, for an increase of 2%.

The evaluation called for in the recommendations should include a thorough analysis of the data base.

APPENDIX C

PROJECT BUDGET

ALLOCATION OF FUNDS
NATIVE EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SERVICE ACTION

O & M Program costs		1986/87	1987/88	1988/89
Education:	In-service Program (50pys)	$1,225,000	$2,000,000	$1,300,000 (30 PY
	On-Job Training	110,000	220,000	(220,000)
	Education Leave	100,000	400,000	400,000
	Training Implementation	60,000	100,000	100,000
	Training Support (1 PY)	35,000	50,000	(50,000)
	Adult Upgrading	50,000	50,000	(50,000)
	Clerk Typist Training	25,000	50,000	50,000
	Arctic College (DPW&H)	113,000	280,000	280,000
	SUB TOTAL	$1,718,000	$3,150,000	$2,130,000
Personnel:	Human Resource Support (3PYs)	85,000	175,000	175,000
	SUB TOTAL	85,000	175,000	175,000
Equal Employment:	Cross Cultural Orientation	60,000	60,000	60,000
	SUB TOTAL	60,000	60,000	60,000
Implementation of Affirmative Action Plans:				
	Culture & Communications	12,000	27,000	25,000
	Economic Development & Tourism	18,000	39,000	39,000
	Finance	17,000	36,000	14,000
	Health	10,000	22,000	22,000
	Justice	20,000	43,000	43,000
	Renewable Resources	21,000	46,000	46,000
	Social Services	51,000	112,000	112,000
	Executive (Include Workers' Comp)	26,000	55,000	55,000
	FMS	3,000	6,000	6,000
	Legislative Assembly	2,000	5,000	No requirement
	N.W.T. Housing Corporation	19,000	41,000	41,000
	Education	44,000	74,000	74,000
	Personnel	10,000	22,000	22,000
	DPW&H	87,000	190,000	190,000
	Government Services	34,000	75,000	75,000
	Equal Employment	2,000	4,000	4,000
	Municipal & Community Affairs	24,000	53,000	55,000
	SUB TOTAL	$400,000	$850,000	$823,000
TOTAL		$2,263,000	$4,235,000	
O & M Infrastructure				
Personnel:		$120,000		
DPW&H:	Office	160,000		395,000
	Housing	240,000		
Govt. Services:	Communications	10,000		
TOTAL		$530,000		$395,000
Capital Infrastructure				
Govt. Services:	Office Furniture & Equip.	178,000		
Personnel:	Staff Housing Furniture & Equip.	29,000		
TOTAL		$207,000		
	TOTAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION	$3,000,000		$3,583,000

APPENDIX D

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY

Northwest Territories Policy

14.03
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

The Government of the Northwest Territories is committed to a competent Public Service that is representative of the population it serves. To that end, the government will undertake affirmative action measures to achieve equality in employment and career development of qualified, suitable and eligible target group persons.

PRINCIPLES

1. Individuals have the responsibility to plan and initiate action to take advantage of Public Service employment, training and career advancement opportunities.

2. The Government of the Northwest Territories should encourage eligible target group persons to seek career and training opportunities in the Public Service.

3. No individual seeking employment, training or career advancement opportunities with the Public Service should be disadvantaged or discouraged by attitudinal or systemic barriers.

4. Eligible target group persons in the Northwest Territories will have preferred access to employment, training and career advancement opportunities in the government.

5. Affirmative action is a positive and integral part of the human resource planning process.

6. The Public Service should serve as a model for affirmative action in the Northwest Territories.

Dennis Patterson
Government Leader and
Chairman of the Executive Council

Reference

For elaboration of this policy refer to Directive.

SCOPE

This directive applies to all departments, agencies and employees of the Government of the Northwest Territories and to eligible target group persons seeking employment, training, and career advancement opportunities with the Public Service of the Government of the Northwest Territories.

DEFINITIONS

1. Affirmative Action

Means the application of measures designed to increase the representation of eligible target groups under-represented within the Public Service.

2. Affirmative Action Plan

Means a coordinated set of strategies and measures directed toward achieving equality in employment and career development of eligible target groups.

3. Attitudinal or Systemic Barrier

Means any attitude, system, policy, practice or procedure differentiating between persons which denies eligible target groups equality in employment and career development.

4. Disabled Persons

Means those persons who are at a disadvantage as a result of a medically certified learning, mental, emotional or physical disability which handicaps the persons from taking advantage of employment, training and career advancement opportunities in a way which would not be encountered by a person without disability.

5. Indigenous Aboriginal Persons

Means those persons who are descendants of the Dene, Inuit or Metis people, indigenous to the present boundaries of the Northwest Territories and includes any aboriginal persons resident at birth pursuant to section 7.1 of the Vital Statistics Act and any Canadian aboriginal persons who have lived more than half of their lives in the Northwest Territories.

6. Indigenous Non-Aboriginal Persons

Means those non-aboriginal persons born in the Northwest Territories, or who have lived more than half their lives in the Northwest Territories.

7. Northwest Territories Affirmative Action Advisory Committee

Means a committee established by the Executive Council composed of nominees from unions, native organizations and special interest groups that provides advice to the Minister of Personnel.

8. Public Service

Means the public service of the Government of the Northwest Territories as defined by the Public Service Act.

9. Resident

Means any person resident in the Northwest Territories for a period of at least one year.

PROVISIONS

1. Authority and Accountability

(a) Executive Council

(i) Establishes an overall planning process, sets priorities and approves strategies for affirmative action for the Government of the Northwest Territories;

(ii) Approves the overall Government Affirmative Action Plan and departmental affirmative action plans;

(iii) Approves the appointment of members to the Northwest Territories Affirmative Action Advisory Committee.

(b) Minister of Personnel

(i) Recommends an overall planning process, priorities and strategies for affirmative action for the Government of the Northwest Territories;

(ii) Recommends the overall Government Affirmative Action Plan;

(iii) Initiates development of departmental affirmative action plans;

(iv) Reviews and recommends departmental affirmative action plans;

(v) Ensures evaluation of affirmative action planning measures;

(vi) Recommends nominees to the Northwest Territories Affirmative Action Advisory Committee;

(vii) Represents the Executive Council on affirmative action matters external to the Public Service.

(c) Deputy Minister of Personnel

(i) Proposes an overall planning process, priorities and strategies for affirmative action for the Government of the Northwest Territories;

(ii) Coordinates government-wide affirmative action measures;

(iii) Reviews affirmative action plans to ensure consistency with the overall planning process, priorities and strategies;

(iv) Advises departments and agencies respecting affirmative action planning;

(v) Monitors the effectiveness of affirmative action planning;

(vi) Provides support to the Northwest Territories Affirmative Action Advisory Committee.

(d) Department Heads

Develop and implement affirmative action plans consistent with the government's overall planning process, priorities and strategies. In fulfilling this responsibility, department heads shall consult with Regional Directors and the Department of Personnel.

(e) Northwest Territories Affirmative Action Advisory Committee

Provides advice to the Minister of Personnel on affirmative action issues.

2. Planning and Implementation

(a) Within the context of an overall government affirmative action planning process, consistent with approved priorities and strategies, all departments and agencies within the Public Service will plan and implement affirmative action measures.

(b) Such planning shall encompass:

(i) encouraging candidacy for under-represented occupations and levels within the Public Service;

(ii) recruiting, training, and promoting within under-represented occupations and levels of the Public Service;

(iii) removing attitudinal and systemic barriers.

(c) Such planning shall incorporate approved strategies, such as:

(i) giving preference in employment, training, and promotion;

(ii) counselling of potential candidates;

(iii) providing public information;

(iv) advertising; and

(v) training.

(d) Planning will identify the actions to be taken, provide reasons for the actions, detail how the plan will be implemented, outline the time frame, assign responsibility, establish monitoring and evaluation requirements.

3. Employment, Training and Promotion

The Government of the Northwest Territories will give preference in employing, training and promoting qualified, suitable and eligible target group persons. Preference will be applied to achieve representativeness only in specified occupations or levels identified in approved affirmative action plans.

(a) Eligible target groups are:

- Indigenous aboriginal persons
- Resident women
- Resident disabled persons
- Indigenous non-aboriginal persons

(b) The merit principle applies among these target groups, except in the following circumstances:

(i) priority will be assigned to qualified indigenous aboriginal persons;

(ii) when special measures are applied to correct a disadvantage being experienced by a specific group.

(c) Individuals may qualify for preference through only one target group.

(d) Where warranted, special circumstances will be reviewed on a case by case basis by the Minister of Personnel.

4. Rights and Freedoms

The Government of the Northwest Territories Affirmative Action Policy shall conform to the Equality Rights provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act and Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

5. Policy Review

In recognition that requirements for an Affirmative Action Policy may change, the policy will be reviewed in the year 1994, or sooner, if, for any eligible target group, the objective of a representative Public Service has been achieved.

6. Prerogative of Executive Council

Nothing in this Directive shall in any way be construed to limit the prerogative of the Executive Council to make decisions to exercise affirmative action for other under-represented groups or any actions outside the provision of this Directive.

Dennis Patterson
Government Leader and
Chairman of the Executive Council